梅洛-庞蒂对现象场的阐释——以《知觉现象学》的文本为依据  

Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of the Phenomenal Field——Based on the Text of The Phenomenology of Perception

作　　者：唐兴华 Tang Xinghua(Department of the History of Science,Tsinghua University,Beijing,China)

机构地区：[1]清华大学科学史系,北京100084

出　　处：《社会科学论坛》2023年第2期230-238,共9页Tribune of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目《算法治理的技术哲学研究》阶段性成果,项目编号:21CZX017。

摘　　要：梅洛-庞蒂批判传统的认识论,认为知觉是一切认识的前提。梅洛-庞蒂强调的知觉意味着认识主体在世界中的体验。因而,他强调直接返回到世界中,在世界中直接体验。认识主体在世界中的知觉过程必然要依赖于现象场,现象场是知觉过程和意义产生的必要场域。梅洛-庞蒂在《知觉现象学》中通过对传统科学认识、传统心理学和理智主义的批判过程中引出现象场的概念,对现象场进行阐释。对梅洛-庞蒂现象场的梳理,有助于理解他所强调的知觉产生过程,在世界中存在的核心思想。Merleau-Ponty criticizes traditional epistemology. He believes that perception is the prerequisite of all-knowing. MerleauPonty’s emphasis on perception implies the experience of the knowing subject in the world. Thus, he emphasizes a direct return to the lived world and direct experience in the world. The perceptual process of the knowing subject in the world necessarily depends on the phenomenal field, which is the necessary field for the perceptual process and the production of meaning. In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty elicits the concept of phenomenal field through the process of critique of scientific, traditional psychology and rationalism, and explicates the phenomenal field. A compendium of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenal field helps to understand the core idea of his emphasis on the process of perception generation, of being in the world.

关 键 词：梅洛-庞蒂 现象场 生活世界 

分 类 号：B565.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]