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作 者:徐鹏[1] 宋方杰 白贵玉 XU Peng;SONG Fangjie;BAI Guiyu(School of Business Administration,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China;School of Business,University of Jinan,Jinan 250002,China)
机构地区:[1]山东财经大学工商管理学院,山东济南250014 [2]济南大学商学院,山东济南250002
出 处:《山东财经大学学报》2023年第2期110-120,F0003,共12页Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目“母子公司高管协同配置驱动机制及效应研究——基于公司治理视角的探索”(71972117);山东省自然科学基金面上项目“资本市场改革背景下上市公司治理稳定性评价与保障机制研究”(ZR2022MG028);泰山学者工程专项经费项目(tsqn202103095);山东省高等学校青创科技支持计划(2021RW009)。
摘 要:以2014—2020年集团框架内沪深两市制造业上市公司为研究样本,通过多元回归分析方法实证检验了母子公司高管联结对上市公司内部控制质量的影响。研究发现:母子公司高管联结可以提高上市公司内部控制质量;相较于国有企业集团,民营企业集团中母子公司高管联结对上市公司内部控制质量的正向作用更强;实际控制人两权分离度越低,母子公司高管联结对上市公司内部控制质量的正向作用越强;高管平均任期越短,母子公司高管联结对上市公司内部控制质量的正向作用越强。进一步研究发现,母子公司高管联结通过提升内部控制质量能够有效降低上市公司审计费用。以上结论对实践中母子公司治理机制的完善与优化具有重要借鉴意义。By taking the listed manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets within the group framework from 2014 to 2020 as the research sample,this study empirically tests the impact of parent-subsidiary company’s senior executive linkage on internal control quality of the listed companies through multiple regression analysis.It is found that a.Parent-subsidiary company’s senior executive linkage can improve the internal control quality of listed companies;b.Compared with state-owned enterprise group,the parent-subsidiary company’s senior executive linkage in private enterprise group has a stronger positive effect on the internal control quality of the listed companies;c.The lower the degree of ownership and control separation of the actual controller,the stronger the positive effect of parent-subsidiary company’s senior executive linkage on the internal control quality of listed companies;and d.The shorter the average tenure of the senior executives,the stronger the positive effect of parent-subsidiary company’s senior executive linkage on the internal control quality of listed companies.Further research shows that parent-subsidiary senior executive linkage can effectively reduce the audit costs of listed companies by improving the internal control quality.The above conclusions have important reference significance for perfecting and optimizing the parent-subsidiary company’s governance mechanism in practice.
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