政府补贴、创新与合并商誉  

Influence of Government Subsidies and Innovation on Consolidated Goodwill

作　　者：高艳慧 马玉涵 GAO Yanhui;MA Yuhan(School of Management,Xi′an Polytechnic University,Xi′an 710048,China.;不详)

机构地区：[1]西安工程大学管理学院,陕西西安710600

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2023年第1期124-129,共6页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：软科学研究计划一般项目(2023-CX-RKX-082).

摘　　要：为了厘清巨额商誉产生的影响因素,从政府补贴和创新两个方面出发,以2007—2020年我国发生并购的全部A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,基于信号传递理论,将创新分为创新数量和创新质量两个方面,分析其对合并商誉的影响;其次,分析政府补贴和创新对合并商誉的综合影响。研究发现:创新质量和创新数量均对公司的合并商誉有显著正向影响,并且创新质量对合并商誉产生的影响更大;政府补贴与创新对合并商誉的影响存在替代效应。With the increasing proportion of huge goodwill in the balance sheet,the hidden risk of goodwill impairment has become a hidden mine for many enterprises.In order to clarify the influencing factors of huge goodwill,this paper takes all A-share non-financial listed companies that took mergers and acquisitions from 2007 to 2020 as the research samples to deeply explore the influence of government subsidies and innovation on combined goodwill.Based on the signal transmission theory,innovation is divided into two aspects:innovation quantity and innovation quality,and its impact on consolidated goodwill is analyzed.Secondly,it analyzes the comprehensive impact of government subsidies and innovation on consolidated goodwill.The results show that both innovation quality and innovation quantity have a significant positive impact on the company′s combined goodwill,and innovation quality has a greater impact on the combined goodwill.Government subsidy and innovation have substitution effect on the goodwill of merger.

关 键 词：政府补贴 创新 合并商誉 信号传递 替代效应 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]