分析师跟踪、机构投资者持股与企业“脱实向虚”  

Analyst Following, Institutional Ownership and Enterprises’ "Transforming from Reality to Virtuality"

作　　者：王勇[1] 郭筱庆 芦雪瑶 WANG Yong;GUO Xiao-qing;LU Xue-yao(College of Economics,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China;College of Management,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China)

机构地区：[1]海南大学经济学院,海南海口570228 [2]海南大学管理学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2023年第2期114-123,共10页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家自然科学基金地区项目(71663015,72164009);海南省哲学社会科学规划课题(HNSK(YB)21-19)。

摘　　要：遏制企业“脱实向虚”趋势是我国经济高质量发展的根基所在。本文构建双向固定效应模型,基于2011—2019年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验分析师跟踪对企业金融化的影响以及机构投资者持股的调节作用。研究发现:资本市场的分析师跟踪能够显著抑制企业金融化进而降低“脱实向虚”风险,机构投资者持股在其中发挥了正向调节作用;作用机制检验表明,分析师跟踪的作用效果系通过缓解企业内外部信息不对称和监督管理层的机会主义行为而实现;拓展性研究显示,机构投资者外部治理作用在一定程度弥补了企业内部治理机制的不足,相较于被动型机构投资者,主动型机构投资者发挥了更为显著的调节作用。本文丰富了企业金融化的市场化治理机制研究,对于我国大力发展分析师和机构投资者队伍,积极引导金融服务回归实体经济具有一定政策含义。Containing the trend of enterprises’ "transforming from reality to virtuality" is the foundation of China’s high-quality economic development. Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2019, this paper uses a two-way fixed-effect model to empirically test the impact of the analyst following on corporate financialization and its moderating effects on the institutional ownership. The study shows that analyst following in the capital market can significantly inhibit corporate financialization,thereby reducing the risk of "transforming from reality to virtuality", and the institutional ownership plays a positive moderating role. The mechanism-of-action test shows that the effects of analyst following are achieved by alleviating the internal and external information asymmetry of the enterprise and supervising the opportunistic behaviors of the management. The results of expansion research reveal that the external governance of institutional ownership has remedied the lack of internal corporate governance mechanisms. And compared with the passive institutional investors, the active ones play a more significant moderating role.This paper enriches research into the market-oriented governance mechanism of corporate financialization,which has certain policy implications for vigorously developing the team of analysts and institutional investors and actively guiding financial services back to the real economy.

关 键 词：分析师跟踪 机构投资者 企业金融化 脱实向虚 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F830[经济管理—国民经济]