股权制衡视角下的家族控制权结构演变研究  

Research on the Evolution of Family Control Structure from the Perspective of Equity Balance

作　　者：钱爱民[1] 吴春天 QIAN Aimin;WU Chuntian(University of International Business and Economics,Beijing,China)

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第4期493-501,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71790604);财政部会计名家培养工程资助项目(财会[2019]19号)。

摘　　要：采用2008~2019年的家族上市公司样本,基于家族控制权模型,探讨股权分散时代股权制衡如何影响家族控制权结构。研究发现,股权制衡度越高,控制家族在股权层面的超额控制越弱,而在董事会层面的超额控制增强,总的家族超额控制权扩大。进一步分析发现,股权制衡对家族超额董事委派的促进作用在存在股权威胁、无代际传承需求以及家族成员同时担任董事长和总经理时更加明显。在关联方交易上,董事会超额控制对股权层面超额控制形成协同,对股权制衡形成对抗。Based on the family control model,we studied the impact of equity checks and balances on the structure of family control in the era of equity decentralization using samples of listed family companies from 2008 to 2019.We find that the higher the degree of equity balance,the weaker the excess control of the controlling family at the equity level,while the excess control at the board level will increase,and the total family excess control power will expand.Further analysis shows that the role of equity balance in promoting the family’s excess director appointment is more obvious when there are equity threats,no intergenerational inheritance needs,and family members serving as chairman and general manager at the same time.In related-party transactions,the excess control of the board level forms a synergy with the excess control of the equity level,while forms a confrontation with the balance of equity.

关 键 词：家族控制权结构 股权制衡 代际传承 股权威胁 关联方交易 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]