细分组织结构,激励组内和组间协作改善协调困境  

Refining Organisational Structure and Incentivising Intra-and Inter-Group Coordination to Improve the Coordination Dilemma

作　　者：姚澜[1] 何佳俐 Yao Lan;He Jiali

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学经济学院,上海市200433

出　　处：《世界经济》2023年第3期207-232,共26页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD082);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72273077);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71803115)的资助。

摘　　要：存在多部门大型组织内部的生产活动由于具有协调博弈的性质而常常效率低下。与文献将所有个体作为一个协作团队进行一次性支付不同,本文提出的两步支付制巧妙地转变了支付结构,能同时激励组内和组间协作:既支付部门内部协作生产的中间产品,又支付各部门间协作生产的最终产品。这种细化的双重支付结构通过同时缩小团队规模和改善协作失败收益,减少了战略不确定性,降低了个体付出努力的风险,从而实现协调成功。通过对照实验,本文证实了理论预测结果,两步支付制对改善协调困境的效果显著:无任何干预的对照组协调成功率仅为8%,而有机制干预实验组的协调成功率稳定在41.7%,且实验组中选择付出努力的个体比例显著高于对照组。Efficient coordination in large groups is a fundamental issue of economic organisations.Here the organisational structure of a large group is refined into smaller team units.Unlike paying individuals based on the performance of a large group,organisations change their payment structure while providing incentives to both individuals and teams to facilitate intra-and inter-group coordination.This two-part payment mechanism can effectively internalise strategic uncertainty from large groups to small teams and reduce the individual risk of making significant efforts to achieve successful coordination.In accordance with the theoretical predictions of efficient action choice in a refined organisation structure,experimental results indicate that the two-part payment mechanism has a significant impact on overcoming the coordination dilemma.Compared to the coordination rate of 8%at baseline,the coordination success rate in the two-part payment treatment remains essentially stable at 41.7%and the proportion of subjects who choose to make an effort is significantly higher than that of the baseline treatment.

关 键 词：协调博弈实验 支付结构 组织规模 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]