第三方信息、税收遵从与国际税收竞争  

Third-Party Information, Tax Compliance and International Tax Competition

作　　者：樊勇 朱沁瑶 李昊楠 Fan Yong;Zhu Qinyao;Li Haonan

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学财政税务学院,北京102206 [2]西南财经大学财政税务学院

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（世界经济导刊）》2022年第8期8-25,共18页JOURNAL OF WORLD ECONOMICS

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71973159);国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA075)。

摘　　要：本文构建双重差分模型考察共同申报准则(CRS)对中国跨国企业税收遵从行为的影响。研究发现,CRS的实施有效提高了中国跨国企业的税收遵从水平,使跨国企业实际有效税率提高约12.8%,该效果对避税地的影响显著高于非避税地。进一步研究表明,CRS的实施对投资产生了内部转移效应(转移至签订CRS国家中金融保密性较高的国家或地区)和外部转移效应(转移至未签订CRS的国家或地区),这两种效应主要是CRS的实施使得各国实际税负水平发生相对变化后形成的国际税收竞争新格局所致。本文为国际税收征管合作提出了新的认识视角。The third-party information reporting system is generally considered to he a basic system designed to promote tax compliance in various countries,but there is limited academic literature in China supporting this.The cur-rent paper constructs a difference-in-differences model to examine the impact of the Common Reporting Standard(CRS)on the tax compliance behaviour of Chinese multinational corporations.The paper finds that the enforcement of the CRS effectively improves the tax compliance level of Chinese multinational corporations,increasing the effective tax rate of multinational corporations by about 12.8%.This effect has a significantly higher impact on tax havens than on non-tax havens.Further study finds that the enforcement of the CRS produces internal transfer effects(transfers to countries or regions with a higher financial secrecy index among the countries that have signed up to use the CRS)and external transfer effects(transfers to countries or regions that have not signed up to use the CRS)on investment.This effect is mainly due to the new pattern of international tax competition formed after the enforcement of the CRS that causes relative changes in the actual tax burden levels of various countries.This paper puts forward a new perspective on international cooperation in tax collection and administration.

关 键 词：第三方信息报告 税收遵从 投资转移效应 国际税收竞争 

分 类 号：F811.4[经济管理—财政学] F276.7F125