装配式建筑绿色供应链的碳减排机制演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction Mechanism in the Green Supply Chain of Assembled Buildings

作　　者：陈芳琳 丁宇 李柯莹 CHEN Fang-lin;DING Yu;LI Ke-ying(Faculty of Civil Engineering and Mechanics,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学土木工程与力学学院,镇江212013

出　　处：《价值工程》2023年第10期39-41,共3页Value Engineering

摘　　要：本文以政府为主体,构建装配式建筑绿色供应链的运行模型,选取装配式建筑绿色供应链的碳减排机制中的关节节点:政府、预制厂商,构建政府-预制厂商的演化博弈模型,探讨是否采取激励政策与是否采取绿色供应链管理对政府和预制厂商达成合作的影响,根据分析结果就如何建设碳减排机制,从政府与预制厂商角度提出相应的发展建议。This article takes the government as the main body,constructs an operational model of the green supply chain of prefabricated buildings,selects the key nodes in the carbon emission reduction mechanism of the green supply chain of prefabricated buildings:the government and prefabricated manufacturers,and constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and prefabricated manufacturers,to explore the impact of adopting incentive policies and green supply chain management on the cooperation between the government and prefabricated manufacturers.Based on the analysis results,corresponding development suggestions are proposed on how to build a carbon emission reduction mechanism from the perspective of the government and prefabrication manufacturers.

关 键 词：装配式建筑 绿色供应链 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]