我国专利药品医疗保险价格谈判的演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game research on price negotiation for patent medicine covered in medical insurance in China

作　　者：王恩楠 朱铭来 WANG En-nan;ZHU Ming-lai(School of Health Policy&Management,Nanjing Medical University,Nanjing Jiangsu 211112,China;Jiangsu Provincial Institute of Health,Nanjing Jiangsu 211112,China;School of Finance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China)

机构地区：[1]南京医科大学医政学院,江苏南京211112 [2]江苏省健康研究院,江苏南京211112 [3]南开大学金融学院,天津300350

出　　处：《中国卫生政策研究》2023年第2期44-51,共8页Chinese Journal of Health Policy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(18BGL199);“公共健康政策与管理创新研究团队”项目。

摘　　要：利用演化博弈理论,结合我国专利药价格谈判现状,建立专利药品价格谈判博弈的演化模型,并进行仿真模拟分析,探究对演化博弈稳定状态产生影响的因素及其作用路径。结果发现,谈判前后专利药品的销售额、谈判双方的谈判初始意愿和变化方向以及对于社会声誉的考量均能够对演化稳定结果产生影响,最终从上述角度提出谈判双方优化专利药品价格谈判的相关建议。Based on the evolutionary game theory and the current situation of patent drug price negotiation in China,this paper establishes an evolutionary model to indicatepatent drug price negotiation,and carries out simulation and empirical analysis to explore factors that influence the stability of evolutionary game and its action path.The results show that the sales of patent drugs before and after negotiations,the initial willingness and direction of negotiation between the negotiating parties and the consideration of social reputation influence a steady expectation of the outcome of evolution.At last,suggestions are proposed for optimizing patent drug prices negotiation based on the above study.

关 键 词：专利药 医疗保险 价格谈判 演化博弈 

分 类 号：R197[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]