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作 者:麦勇[1] 唐悦 孟磊[1] Mai Yong;Tang Yue;Meng Lei(Business School of East China University of Science and Technology)
机构地区:[1]华东理工大学商学院,200237
出 处:《环境经济研究》2023年第1期100-116,共17页Journal of Environmental Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金重大研究计划子课题“大数据情境下的国家级信用平台及金融信用创新应用研究”(92146002);国家社会科学基金项目“绿色规制与上市公司环境信息披露行为问题研究”(20FJYB057)的阶段性成果。
摘 要:随着我国企业环境信息依法披露工作的逐步展开,企业进行环境信息披露的规范要求逐渐提高,由此催生了对企业环境信息披露行为的探讨。本文以重污染行业的上市公司为样本,分析了企业选择性环境信息披露与其绿色声誉之间的关系,并通过异质性分析检验了这种关系在不同外部治理条件下的差异。研究结果表明:“漂绿”类选择性环境信息披露具有“声誉获取”效应,而“声誉获取”的效应会因为严格的环境规制和较高程度的信息不对称而降低。“洗棕”类选择性环境信息披露与绿色声誉之间存在着显著的负相关关系。经过稳健性检验和内生性检验后,上述结论依然成立。针对企业的选择性环境信息披露行为,建议通过政府监管和市场监督两种机制加以治理,以提高企业绿色信息披露的质量。With the gradual development of the legal disclosure of environmental information by enterprises in China,the norms for environmental disclosure by enterprises have gradually improved,but this has also led to various environmental information disclosure behaviors.This paper takes heavily polluting listed companies as samples and analyzes whether companies,selective environmental information disclosure will affect their green reputation.Through the analysis of heterogeneity,this paper examines the differences of this relationship under different external governance conditions,and puts forward relevant policy recommendations.Research has shown that:"green washing"selective environmental infbnnation disclosure has a"reputation acquisition"effect,which can enhance its green reputation,while there is a significant negative correlation between selective environmental infbnnation disclosure of"brown washing"and the company's green reputation.The efficiency of this"reputation acquisition'*effect will be reduced due to external governance such as strict environmental regulations and reduced information asymmetry.After the robustness test and endogeneity test of the model,the conclusion is still valid.This paper concludes that the selective environmental information disclosure of enterprises can be managed through government supervision and market supervision,and the government and market departments should jointly control the selective environmental information disclosure.
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