为什么动物有隐念但没有信念?  

Why Animals Have Aliefs Rather Than Beliefs?

作　　者：王球[1] WANG Qiu

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《哲学分析》2023年第2期35-49,196,共16页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“当代心灵哲学中的动物认知问题研究”(项目编号:20BZX026)阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：许多动物都很聪明,人们关心的是,它们有思想吗?它们是理性的吗?当代哲学家在回答这些问题时,受理性主义影响,总是聚焦于动物是否拥有命题态度式的信念。一些哲学家对戴维森的解答不满意,他们提出了最小化的信念理论,以此辩护动物具备思想和理性。类似地,在曼德鲍姆和达侬看来,有机体只要具备结构化的心理状态就算有信念。然而这类进路不仅无法准确刻画动物真实的心理面貌,更是犯了范畴错误。詹德勒主张,动物的心理状态是隐念而非信念,动物的感知表征,通常也是带有情感的行为指令。尽管隐念也表现出某种程度的结构化特征,但这些特征可由联想来解释,隐念不像信念那样是一种命题态度。一旦隐念理论得到辩护,再去追问动物有没有思想、有没有理性,这些问题将会变得没有意义。Many animals are clever,then people would like to know,whether animals have thoughts,and whether they are rational.Influenced by the modern rationalists like Descartes,when contemporary philosophers answering these questions,they focus on the question that whether animals have beliefs,which are considered as propositional attitudes.Philosophers like Newen and Starzak,who are dissatisfied with Davidsonian standard of beliefs,propose that the minimal theory of beliefs could justify that most animals have beliefs and therefore they are rational.However,in this paper,we argue that the minimal theory of beliefs not only failed to see the actual situations of animal’s mental lives,but also this theory made a category mistake.In the light of theory of aliefs,which is put forwarded by Gendler,we suggest that much of animal’s mental states are aliefs rather than beliefs,even though aliefs themselves are semi-structured,they are not propositional attitudes.

关 键 词：动物 理性 信念 隐念 命题态度 

分 类 号：B15[哲学宗教—世界哲学]