累积投票制强制执行能否保护中小股东利益?--基于断点回归的实证检验  

Can the Compulsory Enforcement of Cumulative Voting System Protect the Interests of Minority Shareholders?:Empirical Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Analysis

作　　者：孙凤娥[1] SUN Feng'e(School of Business,Beijing Forestry University,Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]北京林业大学经济管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2023年第2期72-82,共11页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BTJ001)。

摘　　要：以2008-2020年A股上市公司为样本,运用精确断点回归方法检验累积投票制强制执行对控股股东利益侵占的影响,并进一步考察股权自由现金流水平在其中发挥的调节效应。研究发现:累积投票制强制执行政策能够显著抑制控股股东利益侵占,该政策能够促使上市公司累积投票制的实施,并通过制衡机制、抵御机制及预防机制改善公司治理,保护中小股东利益。进一步研究表明,在股权自由现金流水平越高的企业,累积投票制强制执行越有效。因此,累积投票制强制执行政策具有一定的合理性,应予以坚持并进一步推行。Taking A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as samples,using the regression discontinuity method,this paper examines the influence of compulsory enforcement of cumulative voting system on benefit encroachment by controlling shareholders.Furthermore,the interaction between the cumulative voting system and the level of equity free cash flow on tunneling behavior is investigated.The findings are that the cumulative voting system can significantly inhibit benefit encroachment by controlling shareholders,the cumulative voting system improves corporate governance and protects the interests of minority shareholders through balance mechanism,defenses mechanism and precautions mechanism.Further research shows that free cash flow of equity plays a moderating role in the cumulative voting system s resistance to tunneling.The implication is that the cumulative voting system enforces policy has certain rationality,which should be adhered to and further implemented.

关 键 词：累积投票制 直线投票制 利益侵占 股权自由现金流 断点回归 强制执行 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]