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作 者:赵菊[1,2,3] 曹源红 孙翠英 李晓征 ZHAO Ju;CAO Yuanhong;SUN Cuiying;LI Xiaozheng(School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China;Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision-making,Ministry of Education,Hefei 230009,China;Ministry of Education Engineering Research Center for Intelligent Decision-making&Information System Technologies,Hefei 230009,China;School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)
机构地区:[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009 [2]过程优化与智能决策教育部重点实验室,安徽合肥230009 [3]智能决策与信息系统技术教育部工程研究中心,安徽合肥230009 [4]华南理工大学管理学院,广东广州510640
出 处:《运筹与管理》2023年第3期43-49,共7页Operations Research and Management Science
基 金:国家社会科学基金一般项目(18BGL265)。
摘 要:随着电子商务的蓬勃发展,越来越多的品牌商入驻在线零售平台,并购买平台的多渠道广告推送服务。考虑两个不对称决策权力的品牌商通过同一零售平台寄售两种替代性产品,研究了平台主导下品牌商的广告投入和价格竞争博弈策略以及零售平台的广告服务定价和寄售收益共享比例决策。研究发现,两品牌商的广告投入和价格竞争策略受到先动优势和成本优势的双重影响:高成本主导品牌商选择低广告投入、低零售价格策略,而跟随者投入更多广告、设置更高零售价格;低成本主导品牌商会采取高广告投入、低零售价格策略,而跟随者会采用低广告投入、高零售价格策略。此外,广告服务弹性系数的增加和交叉价格弹性系数的增加会加剧品牌商的价格和广告服务水平竞争,而零售平台则降低单位广告服务津贴吸引品牌商更多的广告投入,同时增加收益共享比例,但是当自身价格弹性系数增加时,零售平台会采取相反的策略。With the vigorous development of e-commerce,platform retailing is rapidly emerging,such as Amazon and Jingdong.More and more brands enter online retail platforms in the marketplace model(i.e.,commission model),while platforms provide services for brands to broaden market demand.In the online retail environment,advertising investment is the most important way for e-commerce platform sellers to attract consumers.Online platforms use platforms’superior resources to push multi-channel advertising according to brands’advertising needs,and charge brands the corresponding level of advertising service fees.Therefore,brands who reside in the platform can purchase multi-channel advertising push services to increase the market competitiveness.In addition,in the era of e-commerce,many retail giants(e.g.Jingdong,Walmart,etc.)hold the dominant power in the supply chain system,while the power of brands is often asymmetrical.Based on the above background,this paper considers that two brands with asymmetric decision-making power consign two alternative products through the same retail platform,and studies the advertising investment and price game strategy of the brands under the platform’s dominance and the decisions on advertising service pricing and consignment revenue sharing ratios for the retail platform.The literature about asymmetric power competition mainly focuses on price competition,but it does not consider the decision of advertising service level.As a more and more important product advertising service in business practice,it not only affects consumers’purchase choices,but also stimulates market demand.Under the asymmetric decision-making power structure,this paper studies the advertising service level decision-making and product pricing decision-making,which is of certain theoretical significance and practical value.This paper constructs Stackelberg game model dominated by a retail platform and Stackelberg game model of two asymmetric brands.Decisions of the retail platform and the two brands are divided int
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