人际交互视角下基层组织治理的仿真研究  

Simulation Research on Grass-roots Organization Governance fromthe Perspective of Interpersonal Interactions

作　　者：张文明[1] 杨雯秀 许洁 ZHANG Wenming;YANG Wenxiu;XU Jie(School of Economics and Management,Northwest University,Xi’an 710127,China)

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第3期137-142,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：教育部人文社科规划项目(18XJAZHDD4)。

摘　　要：运用基于Agent仿真的方法,用重复囚徒困境模型来刻画基层组织中个体间的交互行为,并把个体的不同行为特点抽象为博弈策略,从而构建出人际交互仿真模型。然后,对比分析无管理者、管理者受强监督、管理者受弱监督、以及管理者不受监督机制下各种博弈策略的平均收益和全部个体的总平均收益。结果表明,四种机制的优劣顺序为:管理者受强监督机制>管理者受弱监督机制>无管理者机制>管理者不受监督机制。管理者受监督的机制才是最有效率、最能保障“好人”的利益从而能够“引人向善”的组织形式。Suppose that n persons with their own behavioral characteristics live in a limited area.Some persons here are willing to be kind to others,while others choose to be selfish.Some are penny-pinching,while others may be weathercocks.When two persons meet,they will determine their behaviors according to their own behavior characteristics,and accordingly,obtain their own profits.What kinds of person will succeed in a long run?To discuss the above problem,the agent-based simulation method is used to describe the interaction between persons in grass-roots organizations by using the repeated prisoner’dilemma model,where the different behavior characteristics of persons are modeled as strategies,and four simulation models with no manager,strongly supervised managers,weakly supervised managers,and no supervised managers are constructed,respectively.In the no manager model,we design 12 strategies to depict the behavior of different persons and find that the“cunning men”get the highest profits.The reason may be that the persons of this strategy can not only ensure that they will not be retaliated by selfish persons but also benefit from friendly ones.It implies that no manager mechanism is not a suitable form for grass-roots organizations.In the models with managers,managers are elected.Three sub-models are discussed below.In the model with strongly supervised managers,managers must always cooperate in the interaction with others.In this case,the“good men”with the always-cooperation-strategy,who are always cooperative with others,get the highest profits.It is may be that the election mechanism provides them with an important opportunity to be elected as managers to improve their profits.In the model with weakly supervised managers,some elected managers may choose to betray,while others still cooperate.Therefore,each strategy is changed into two strategies,for example,the always-cooperation-strategy is changed into two strategies:the really-always-cooperation-strategy,who is still cooperative after being elected as

关 键 词：人际交互 基层组织治理 重复囚徒困境 Agent建模与仿真 

分 类 号：C94[自然科学总论—系统科学]