产品市场竞争能抑制超额商誉吗?  

Can Product Market Competition Inhibit Excess Goodwill?

作　　者：赵彦锋 来培德 王孟孟 ZHAO Yanfeng;LAI Peide;WANG Mengmeng(School of Accounting,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046,China)

机构地区：[1]河南财经政法大学会计学院,河南郑州450046

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2023年第2期78-86,共9页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：河南省科技厅软科学项目(232400412039);国家社科基金青年项目(22CJL013)。

摘　　要：基于中国A股上市公司2008—2020年数据,考察了产品市场竞争对超额商誉的影响及作用机制。研究发现,产品市场竞争具有抑制超额商誉的效应,并能够降低后续商誉减值的可能性;作用机制检验结果表明,产品市场竞争通过降低管理层代理成本、提高股票流动性抑制了超额商誉;异质性检验结果表明,内外部环境对产品市场竞争与超额商誉之间的关系具有异质影响,在内控质量、独立董事比例高或机构投资者持股比例、分析师关注度低时,产品市场竞争对超额商誉的抑制作用更加显著;经济后果分析发现,产品市场竞争对超额商誉的抑制具有缓解融资约束和提升企业价值的效应。Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020,this paper investigates the effect of product market competition on excess goodwill and its mechanism.The results show that product market competition can inhibit excess goodwill and reduce the possibility of subsequent goodwill impairment.The mechanism test shows that reducing agency cost and improving stock liquidity are the mechanism of product market competition to restrain excess goodwill.Further analysis shows that internal and external environments have heterogeneous influence on the relationship between product market competition and excess goodwill.From the perspective of internal governance,product market competition has a more significant inhibitory effect on excess goodwill in enterprises with high quality of internal control and high proportion of independent directors.From the perspective of external environment,product market competition has a more significant inhibitory effect on excess goodwill in enterprises with low shareholding ratio of institutional investors and low attention of analysts.The analysis of economic consequences shows that the inhibition of product market competition on excess goodwill has the effect of easing financing constraints and enhancing value.

关 键 词：产品市场竞争 超额商誉 代理成本 股票流动性 商誉减值 融资约束 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]