巡视监督能够提升战略风险承担水平吗——基于中央企业控股上市公司的经验证据  

Does Inspection Supervision Improve Strategic Risk Taking?Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies Controlled by Central Enterprises

作　　者：宋常[1] 黄岩 王丽娟 CHANG SONG;YAN HUANG;LIJUAN WANG

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2022年第2期189-216,共28页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(14AGL008)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于2009-2015年中央巡视工作领导小组开展的中央企业巡视监督事件,采用渐进性的双重差分模型,考察巡视监督对于被巡视中央企业战略风险承担水平的影响.研究表明,巡视监督能够显著提升中央企业控股上市公司的战略风险承担水平;机制检验发现,巡视监督对战略风险承担的提升作用是通过降低中央企业代理成本与政治风险实现的.进一步研究表明,巡视监督能够提高中央企业控股上市公司的投资水平,改善投资不足,提升投资效率;具体地,被巡视监督后,企业增加了长期投资、无形资产投资和并购投资;巡视监督与战略风险承担的正向关系在高管持股比例较高、高管职业生涯关注度较高以及信息环境较差的中央企业控股上市公司中更强.本文丰富了政治监督与企业经济活动关系的研究.This paper examines the impact of inspection supervision on strategic risk taking of inspected central enterprises,based on central enterprise inspection events from 2009 to 2015 executed by CPC Central Committee Leading Group for Inspection Work,using multi-phase DID model.The result shows that,inspection supervision significantly improves strategic risk taking of listed companies controlled by central enterprises.The mechanism tests indicate that inspection supervision improves strategic risk taking by reducing self-interest motivation of top managers and by reducing the political risk of enterprises.Further research shows that inspection supervision raises investment level,alleviates underinvestment and improves investment efficiency.Specifically,companies controlled by central enterprises increase long-term investment,intangible-asset investment and M&A investment after the inspection supervision.The positive relationship between inspection supervision and strategic risk taking is stronger in companies controlled by central enterprises with higher executive shareholding,higher career concern,and poorer information environment.This paper enriches study on the relation between political supervision and enterprise's economic activities.

关 键 词：巡视监督 中央企业 战略风险承担 投资不足 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学] F276.1[政治法律—中共党史] F832.51[经济管理—企业管理] F272.3[经济管理—国民经济]