老年用户在线健康信息安全监管的演化博弈分析  

Analysis of Health Information Security Supervision of Elderly Users in Online Health Communities from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

作　　者：蒋知义[1] 刘鑫 杨淼城 廖敏秀[1] JIANG Zhi-yi;LIU Xin;YANG Miao-cheng;LIAO Min-xiu(Xiangtan University Library,Xiangtan 411105,China;School of Public Administration,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学图书馆 [2]湘潭大学公共管理学院,411105

出　　处：《大学图书情报学刊》2023年第3期3-10,共8页Journal of Academic Library and Information Science

基　　金：湖南省社会科学基金一般项目“智慧城市信息安全风险评估指标体系研究”(18YBA398)。

摘　　要：对老年用户在线健康信息安全监管问题进行演化博弈分析,可以为监管主体有效应对信息风险和漏洞带来的信息安全危机、加强多方位的信息安全监管提供一定参考。构建在线健康社区运营方和政府间的博弈模型,从成本收益的角度分析不同策略下双方博弈的稳定条件,并利用Matlab仿真分析不同成本以及政府惩罚值对主体策略的影响。结果表明,惩罚值能同时影响政府和运营方的策略选择,且当政府加强监管的成本和运营方加强管理的额外成本都低于发生安全事件后各自承担的损失时,理想稳定策略出现。The analysis of health information security supervision of elderly users in online health community from the perspective of evolutionary game is beneficial to provide reference for supervisors to effectively deal with information security crises caused by information risks and loopholes,and to strengthen multi-faceted information security supervision.This article attempts to build a game model between online health community operators and the government,analyze the stability conditions of the game between the two parties under different strategies from the perspective of cost and benefit,and use Matlab to simulate the impact of different costs and government penalties on the main strategy.The results show that the penalty value can affect the strategy choice of the government and the operator at the same time,and when the cost of the government to strengthen supervision and the additional cost of the operator to strengthen the management is lower than the losses they bear after a security incident,the ideal stable strategy appears.

关 键 词：在线健康社区 老年用户 健康信息 信息安全监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：G252[文化科学—图书馆学] R-05[医药卫生]