农村公共物品的“诱致性供给过剩”及其治理  

Induced Oversupply of Rural Public Goods and Its Governance

作　　者：金江峰 JIN Jiang-feng(China Institute for Rural Studies&Advanced Institute in Political Sciences,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,China)

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学中国农村研究院/政治科学高等研究院,湖北武汉430079

出　　处：《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第3期107-115,共9页Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(22CDJ049);中国博士后科学基金第72批面上项目(2022M721295)。

摘　　要：当前农村公共物品供给的主要模式是政社合作型。政府与村庄之间在资源上的相互诱导与吸引,导致资源低效、浪费和不均衡不合理供给,即农村公共物品的“诱致性供给过剩”。农村公共物品“诱致性供给过剩”主要源于政府自上而下项目激励、村组干部横向社会竞争和村庄自下而上资源吸附三重机制。化解农村公共物品“诱致性供给过剩”问题,可通过包干式资源投入、监管结合的村财制度和落实村级民主参与制度等,对“公有”和“共有”的“公共池塘资源”进行有效治理。At present,public goods supply in rural areas is in a mode of government-community cooperation.There are mutual inducement and attraction on resources between the government and the village,which may easily bring about low efficiency,waste and unbalanced supply of resources and eventually lead to″induced oversupply″of rural public goods.This phenomenon mainly comes from a triple mechanism—government′s top-down project incentive,village cadres′horizontal social competition and villages′bottom-up resource absorption.To tackle this problem,measures like all-inclusive resource investment,a combination of supervision and management of village financial system,and innovations on village-level democratic participation should be taken in order to effectively manage the″public″and″collective″in the common pool resources.

关 键 词：资源下乡 农村公共物品 项目制 民主参与 

分 类 号：D638[政治法律—政治学]