考虑买方抗衡势力及产能约束的供应链决策研究  

Decision Research of Supply Chain Considering Buyer Power and Capacity Constraint

作　　者：冯春[1,2] 罗茂 蒋雪 周鑫昕 FENG Chun;LUO Mao;JIANG Xue;ZHOU Xinxin(School of Logistics Engineering,Southwest Jiao Tong University,Chengdu,Sichuan 610031,China;National United Engineering Laboratory of Integrated and Intelligent Transportation,Southwest Jiao Tong University,Chengdu,Sichuan 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院,四川成都610031 [2]西南交通大学综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室,四川成都610031

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2023年第2期120-128,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(17BGL085)。

摘　　要：考虑由多个供应商和多个零售商组成的供应商主导型供应链,构建了均不考虑买方抗衡势力和产能约束条件、仅考虑买方抗衡势力以及同时考虑买方抗衡势力和产能约束三种情形的Stackelberg博弈模型,考察了零售商数量及市场需求波动对成员均衡决策及利润的影响,分析了买方抗衡势力下考虑产能约束与否的供应链策略差异,并通过数值计算探讨其对供应链决策的影响。结果表明:当考虑零售商买方抗衡势力时,零售商数量的增加削弱了买方势力,且每个零售商愿意为自己的订单支付更多的费用,进而导致了更高的批发价格;在此情形下,考虑产能约束且当供应商生产能力低于无产能约束的均衡生产量时,产能约束对批发价产生正面影响,且供应商利润不总是减少。With regard to the"supplier-led"supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and multiple retailers,three Stackelberg game models were constructed by not considering the constraints(CN),only considering the countervailing power(MN),and jointly considering the countervailing power and capacity constraints(MY).The influences of the number of retailers and the fluctuation of market demand on equilibrium decisions and profit were investigated.Furthermore,the differences in decisions of supply chain with the capacity constraints or not under countervailing power were discovered,where the numerical analysis was used to demonstrate the optimal decision of supply chains.It is found that from the retailer countervailing power side,the increase in the number of retailers will weaken the buyer power,and the retailers will willingly endorse the extra expenses for their orders as well,thereby resulting in higher wholesale prices.In this case,under the consideration of capacity constraints,when the relevant suppliers'production capacity is lower than the equilibrium production without capacity constraints,the effects on wholesale keep positive and the supplier profits are not always decreased.

关 键 词：随机市场需求 零售商竞争 产能约束 博弈理论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]