纵向兼任高管能提升智力资本价值创造效率吗?--基于中国A股农业上市公司实证分析  

Can Vertical Interlocked Executives Improve the Efficiency of Intellectual Capital Value Creation?——An Empirical Analysis Based on Chinese A-share Agricultural Listed Companies

作　　者：朱骊禧 吴玉宇[1] ZHU Lixi;WU Yuyu(School of Economics,Hunan Agricultural University 9Changsha,Hunan 410128,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南农业大学经济学院,湖南长沙410128

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2023年第3期132-139,共8页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(20AJY012)。

摘　　要：基于智力资本理论,依据中国A股农业上市公司2008-2021年年度数据,考察纵向兼任高管对智力资本价值创造效率的影响。结果显示:纵向兼任高管与智力资本价值创造效率呈负相关,增加机构投资者持股可以改善这种负向效应;纵向兼任高管职位越高,对智力资本价值创造的抑制效应越明显;纵向兼任高管与智力资本技术创新专利产出呈负相关。鉴于此,农业上市公司应重视纵向兼任高管对智力资本价值创造效率的负面影响,可通过增加机构投资者持股来降低对它产生的不利影响,提升智力资本价值创造效率。Based on the intellectual capital theory and the annual data of Chinese agricultural A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2021,this paper examines whether vertical interlocked executive positions can improve the value creation efficiency of intellectual capital.The results show that there is a negative correlation between vertical interlocked executive positions and the value creation efficiency of intellectual capital,and the increase of institutional investor shareholding can improve this negative effect.The vertical concurrent interlocked executive position is positively correlated with the value creation effect of intellectual capital.There is a negative correlation between vertical interlocked executive position and patent output of intellectual capital technology innovation.Therefore,listed agricultural companies should pay more attention to the influence of vertical interlocked executives on the value creation efficiency of intellectual capital.We can reduce the negative impact on them and improve the value creation efficiency of intellectual capital,by increasing the shareholding of institutional investors.

关 键 词：农业上市公司 纵向兼任高管 智力资本价值创造效率 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]