基于公平关切下物流末端服务商供应链决策  

Supply Chain Decision-making of Logistics Terminal Service Providers Based on Fairness Concerns

作　　者：冉文学[1] 陈雅静 RAN Wenxue;CHEN Yajing(School of Logistics and Management Engineering,Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,Kunming 650221,China)

机构地区：[1]云南财经大学物流与管理工程学院,云南昆明650221

出　　处：《物流科技》2023年第13期1-5,10,共6页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“基于轮询控制机理的电子商务环境下物流中心订单分拣系统研究”(71661029)。

摘　　要：在闭环供应链中,研究在公平关切下如何使供应链主体实现利益最大化具有重要作用。文章构建生产商和零售商组成的供应链系统,根据产品价格做出相应反应,从而决定产品销售价格和回收努力水平。运用Stackelberg博弈模型对物流末端服务商公平关切的供应链决策进行研究。研究表明:若生产商没有考虑到零售商的公平,零售商的公平程度与其回收工作的程度和废品产品的回收率呈负相关。反之,零售商的公平程度与整个供应链的收益有显著的相关性。当供应链进行集中决策时,双方都在追求自身的利益,故不存在公平关切的行为。In the closed-loop supply chain,it is important to study how to maximize the interests of supply chain entities under fairness concerns.This article builds a supply chain system of producers and retailers that responds accordingly to product prices to determine product sales prices and recycling effort levels.The Stackelberg game model is used to study the supply chain decision-making of logistics terminal service providers that are concerned about fairness.Studies have shown that if manufacturers do not take into account retailers'fairness,retailers'fairness is inversely correlated with the degree of recycling efforts and the recycling rate of waste products.Conversely,the fairness of retailers correlates significantly with the profitability of the entire supply chain.When the supply chain makes centralized decisions.Both sides are pursuing their own interests,so there is no fairness concern.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 公平关切 STACKELBERG博弈模型 回收再制造 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]