数字经济与大股东掏空行为:技术治理的新视角  

Digital Economy and Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders:A New Perspective of Technological Governance

作　　者：张嘉伟 王铷州 蒋影 ZHANG Jia-wei;WANG Ru-zhou;JIANG Ying(School of Business,Nanjing University,Nanjing,Jiangsu,210093,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《经济管理》2023年第4期64-81,共18页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“道德内化与公司治理——基于中国文化的理论和实证”(72272076);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地“南京大学长江三角洲经济社会发展研究中心”暨“区域经济转型与管理变革协同创新中心”重大课题项目“长三角区域提升上市公司质量及治理水平研究”(CYD-2020002)。

摘　　要：以大股东掏空为代表的第二类代理问题始终是新兴市场公司治理中的关键议题,受到学界、业界和监管部门的持续关注。在新的技术和经济背景下,能否从技术治理视角探讨数字经济对大股东掏空行为的影响具有理论上的创新价值和实践上的现实价值。本文研究表明:数字经济能够显著抑制大股东掏空行为,数字经济水平越高,大股东掏空程度越低,这一结果通过多种检验后依然稳健,信息机制和竞争机制是数字经济抑制大股东掏空行为的核心机制。市场化程度和法治环境水平越高,数字经济抑制大股东掏空行为的作用越显著。本文进一步分析了技术治理与制度治理之间关系,通过实证检验发现,数字经济对管理层持股和内部控制具有替代效应,对机构投资者持股和国有企业所有者缺位具有补充效应。本研究为抑制大股东掏空行为,缓解第二类代理问题提供了新的研究视角和解决方案,对数字经济时代探索新型监管模式、推动企业长远健康发展具有重要意义。The second type of agency problem,represented by controlling shareholder tunneling,has persistently plagued corporate governance in emerging market countries.This issue has caused severe negative impacts on stakeholders and the overall healthy development of the economy,attracting widespread attention from the academic community.The financing needs of controlling shareholders,as well as their ability and information advantages,lead to the motivation and conditions for implementing tunneling activities.Existing research mainly focuses on the ability advantage of controlling shareholders,attempting to restrain and weaken their advantages through institutional governance to curb tunneling behaviors.However,institutions exhibit three characteristics:incompleteness,lagging,and loopholes in prescribed behaviors,which result in endogenous contradictions between institutional supply and practical circumstances.Consequently,controlling shareholder tunneling activities continue to emerge,and even new forms of tunneling have arisen.Existing research mainly focused on the ability advantage of controlling shareholders,but few scholars have paid attention to the information advantage they possess.Even when considering the information advantage of controlling shareholders,the approach relies on information disclosure laws and regulations.The implementation of these information disclosure laws and regulations has not significantly reduced the information advantage of controlling shareholders.Instead,it has given rise to opportunistic tunneling behaviors that evade these regulations.Motivated by this,the present study aims to examine whether and how the digital economy can restrain controlling shareholder tunneling behaviors in the context of today's information age characterized by widespread internet connectivity.This study demonstrates that the digital economy can significantly restrain controlling shareholder tunneling behaviors.The higher the level of the digital economy,the lower the extent of tunneling by controlling share

关 键 词：第二类代理问题 数字经济 大股东掏空行为 技术治理 制度治理 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]