论芬利对道德错论的相对式批判——基于与乔伊斯的论辩  

Finlay's Relativistic Criticism of the Moral Error Theory--Based on the Argument with Joyce

作　　者：张昱顾 Zhang Yugu(School of Public Administration,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《齐鲁师范学院学报》2023年第3期87-93,共7页Journal of Qilu Normal University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“建设具有强大凝聚力和引领力的社会主义意识形态研究”(18VZT004)。

摘　　要：在元伦理学的研究中,道德错论一经提出就引起了学界的广泛关注,但该观点由于动摇了伦理学的根基,受到包括芬利在内诸多学者的反对。芬利通过论证道德陈述的一般相对化结构以反对错论者所依赖的非制度性绝对命令,同时提出一种制度性道德判断形式的现实存在可能。文章从芬利和乔伊斯的论辩证据出发,对道德判断形式和道德论述本质做出合理论证,说明道德错论的理论证据存在诸多不合理之处,道德论述背后的相对化结构才是正当有效的,这为道德的事实正当性谋求了可能出路。In the study of metaethics,the theory of moral error has aroused widespread concern in the academic community since it was proposed.However,this view has been opposed by many scholars,including Finley,because it has shaken the foundation of ethics.By demonstrating the general relativistic structure of moral statements and the non-institutional absolute command relied on by the wrong theorist,Finley proposed the realistic possibility of a form of institutional moral judgment.Based on the argumentative evidence of Finley and Joyce,and through a reasonable demonstration of the form of moral judgment and the essence of moral discourse,this article demonstrates that there are many unreasonable aspects in the theoretical evidence of Moral Error Theory,while the relative structural form behind moral discourse is indeed reasonable and effective,which provides a possible way out for the factual justification of morality.

关 键 词：道德错论 道德相对主义 绝对权威 元伦理学 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]