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作 者:李瑜[1] 郑明会 LI Yu;ZHENG Ming-hui(School of Economics and Management,Yan′an University,Yan′an 716000,Shaanxi)
机构地区:[1]延安大学经济与管理学院,陕西延安716000
出 处:《延安大学学报(社会科学版)》2023年第3期70-81,共12页Journal of Yan'an University (Social Sciences Edition)
摘 要:股权结构决定公司治理结构,合理的股权制衡可以强化监督,有效降低股价变动风险。以2010—2020年深沪A股上市公司为研究样本,基于风险承担视角,运用多元回归分析模型,对终极控股股东控制权与股票特质风险之间的关系进行实证研究。研究表明:终极控股股东控制权能够显著提高公司股票特质风险,风险承担在其中发挥着中介效应,信息不透明度正向调节终极控股股东控制权与股票特质性风险之间的关系,股权制衡度能够抑制终极控股股东控制权对股票特质风险的影响。The shareholding structure determines the corporate governance structure,and reasonable equity balance can strengthen the supervision and effectively reduce the risk of stock price changes.The relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder control and stock idiosyncratic risk is studied empirically by using a multiple regression analysis model based on the risk-taking perspective with a sample of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2010 to 2020.The study shows that:ultimate controlling shareholder control can significantly increase the stock idiosyncratic risk of a company,risk-taking plays a mediating effect,information opacity positively moderates the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder control and stock idiosyncratic risk,and equity checks and balances can suppress the effect of ultimate controlling shareholder control on stock idiosyncratic risk.
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