优化营商环境背景下董事忠实义务规范再构  

The Reconstruction of Director’s Duty of Loyalty under the Background of Optimizing Business Environment

作　　者：李燕[1,2,3] Li Yan

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学民商法学院,重庆400031 [2]西南政法大学重庆市场交易法律制度研究基地,重庆400031 [3]西南政法大学营商环境与社会信用研究院,重庆400031

出　　处：《学海》2023年第3期195-206,共12页Academia Bimestris

基　　金：四川省、重庆市社科规划“成渝地区双城经济圈建设”重大项目“成渝地区双城经济圈共同营造一流营商环境研究”的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：董事忠实义务旨在遏制董事机会主义行为,保护股东利益,是契合营商环境投资者保护目标的重要公司法制。在优化营商环境背景下,我国董事忠实义务制度存在“趋同”与“存续”的冲突,在制定法层面与域外法渐趋靠拢,在司法实践层面却未发挥出预期效果。应遵循结合价值目标与本土要素来关照营商环境指标的进路优化董事忠实义务规范;根据公司类型及股权结构区别规范自我交易批准权的行使主体及判别标准;通过科以利害关系董事披露义务保护小股东利益,以及优化证明责任分配规范平衡各方利益。将不篡夺公司商业机会与竞业禁止明确为两种不同的义务类型,以彰显各自的制度价值。Directors’duty of loyalty aims to curb directors’opportunistic behavior and protect the interests of shareholders,which is an important corporate legal system in line with the goal of business environment and investor protection.Under the background of optimizing the business environment,there is a conflict between convergence and existence in the system of directors’duty of loyalty in China.In the level of statutory law,it is gradually close to the extraterritorial law,but in the level of judicial practice,it does not play the expected effect.We should follow the approach of combining value objectives and local factors to optimize the norms of director’s duty of loyalty.According to the type of the company and the structure of the stock right,we should distinguish and standardize the exercising subject and the judging standard of the self-dealing approval right;We should protect the interests of minority shareholders through the disclosure obligation of interested directors,and optimize the allocation of burden of proof to balance the interests of all parties.Non-usurpation of business opportunities and prohibition of business strife are defined as two different types of obligations in order to highlight their respective institutional values.

关 键 词：营商环境 忠实义务 自我交易 公司机会原则 竞业禁止 

分 类 号：D922.291.91[政治法律—经济法学]