多个大股东对企业费用粘性的影响研究  

The Effect of Multiple Large Shareholders On Corporate-Cost Stickiness

作　　者：侯晓红[1] 潘瑶 HOU Xiaohong;PAN Yao

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《中国矿业大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第3期119-132,共14页Journal of China University of Mining & Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“基于价值创造的上市公司业绩评价理论与模型研究”(项目编号:07BJY028);教育部人文社科项目“公允价值计量的经济后果与监管研究”(项目编号:10YJA790069)。

摘　　要：多个大股东可以限制控股股东的私利行为,但大股东之间的协调成本,可能使监督管理者自利行为的力度和效率下降,导致费用粘性增加。基于此,以2010—2020年沪深A股企业为样本,检验了多个大股东对企业费用粘性的影响。研究结果表明,多个大股东的股权结构会增加企业的费用粘性;除控股股东外,其他大股东数量越多、持股比例越多,对费用粘性的增加作用越强。在使用固定效应模型、倾向得分匹配和Heckman两阶段模型控制内生性,以及变换年份和大股东衡量标准后,结论依旧稳健。进一步研究发现:多个大股东对费用粘性的增加作用是通过代理成本这一中介实现的,其对费用粘性的增加作用在非国有企业、市场化程度低的企业中更加明显。研究补充了多个大股东对管理者成本管理行为的负面影响,为全面理解多个大股东这一股权结构在公司治理中的作用提供了经验证据。Multiple large shareholders can alleviate the private interests of the controlling shareholders.However,the coordination cost between the large share holders may reduce the strength and efficiency of supervision of managers'self-interest behavior,resulting in increased cost stickiness.Based on this,the study tests the impact of multiple large shareholders on cost stickiness using the data of A-share companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market in China from 2010 to 2020.The results show that the ownership structure of multiple large shareholders will increase the cost stickiness.And in addition to controlling shareholders,the more large shareholders and the greater the shareholding ratio,and the stronger the increase in the cost stickiness.After using the fixed effect model,propensity score matching and Heckman two-stage model control endogeneity,as well as changing the year and the measurement standard of major shareholders,the conclusion is still robust.Further research finds that the increase in cost stickiness of multiple large shareholders is realized through solving the agency problem.And the increase is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises and low degree of market-oriented enterprises.The research supplements the negative impact of multiple large shareholders on the cost management behavior of managers,and provides empirical evidence for a comprehensive understanding of the role of multiple large shareholders in corporate governance.

关 键 词：多个大股东 费用粘性 代理问题 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]