银行组织层级与贷款契约行为——来自商业银行事业部制改革的经验证据  

The Bank Organizational Level and Loan Contract Behaviors:Empirical Evidence from Commercial Bank Divisional System Reform

作　　者：新夫[1] 牛月月 Fu Xin;Yueyue Niu(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing Jiangsu 211100,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2023年第2期99-117,共19页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(19BJY029);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(18YJC790189);财政部国际化高端会计人才培养工程(2020)。

摘　　要：研究基于商业银行事业部制改革事件,手工收集2001-2018年上市公司银行贷款信息,利用银保监会金融许可证信息确定贷款银行分支机构组织层级后,发现银行组织层级会对贷款契约行为产生利率效应、抵押效应和期限效应,即商业银行事业部制改革后,贷款银行组织层级越低,贷款利率越高,越可能采用抵押贷款,贷款期限也越短。检验信息沟通机制、所有权机制和数字金融环境机制后发现,上述效应在创新企业、国有企业和数字金融发展环境三方面存在显著差异。Based on the commercial bank divisional system reform,the research hand-collects the bank loan information of listed companies from 2001 to 2018 and identifies the organizational levels of the lending banks’branches through the financial license information issued by the China Banking Regulatory Commission.The results finds that the bank organization level has interest rate effect,mortgage effect and term effect on the loan contract behaviors.That is,after the commercial bank divisional system reform,the lower the organizational level of the lending banks,the higher the loan interest rates,the more likely to adopt mortgage loans,and the shorter the loan terms.Further,by investigating the information communication mechanism,ownership mechanism and digital financial environment mechanism,the research finds the significant differences among the above three effects in innovative enterprises,state-owned enterprises and enterprises in regions with digital financial development.

关 键 词：商业银行 事业部制改革 银行组织层级 贷款契约行为 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]