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作 者:刘鹏[1] 崔雪[1] LIU Peng;CUI Xue(School of Electrical Engineering and Automation,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
机构地区:[1]武汉大学电气与自动化学院,湖北武汉430072
出 处:《电力科学与技术学报》2023年第2期9-17,39,共10页Journal of Electric Power Science And Technology
基 金:国家自然科学基金(61873194)。
摘 要:随着双碳目标的推进和电力市场化改革的深入,研究电力批发市场发电侧多主体博弈对提高清洁能源利用率具有现实意义。针对发电商市场地位不对称,提出了计及碳交易成本下考虑市场份额偏好的电力批发市场寡头古诺-伯川德混合博弈模型。对所建博弈模型进行数学推理和数值分析,给出了电力批发市场动态博弈的均衡特征数值和局部稳定域。最后,研究了碳排放系数、发电商水平差异性参数、市场份额偏好参数对市场均衡的影响。算例结果表明:随着发电商水平差异性减小,发电商市场利润大幅缩减,化石燃料发电商电能产量呈U型趋势;考虑市场份额偏好下,偏好利润的发电商将采取控制电能供应量、抬高批发市场电价的竞争策略,以最大限度追求利润最大化。With the advancement of carbon-neutral goal and the deepening of electricity market reform,it is of practical significance to study multi-agent game on power generation side of electricity wholesale market to improve renewable energy permeability.Aiming at asymmetric market position,a Cournot-Bertrand hybrid game model considering market share preference with carbon transaction cost is established.Performing mathematical reasoning and numerical analysis,equilibrium characteristic value and local stability region are given.Finally,the influence of carbon emission coefficient,horizontal difference parameter and market share preference parameter on equilibrium is studied.Simulation examples show that with the decrease of horizontal difference parameter,market profits are significantly reduced,and electricity output of thermal power generation suppliers shows a U-shaped trend.Considering market share preference,profit-seeking power generation suppliers will take the competitive strategy of controlling power supply and raising electricity price to maximize profits.
关 键 词:电力批发市场 双碳目标 古诺-伯川德混合博弈 市场份额偏好 均衡分析
分 类 号:TN919[电子电信—通信与信息系统]
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