党组织嵌入能抑制高管薪酬黏性吗?  

Can Party Organization Embeddedness Restrain Executive Pay Stickiness?

作　　者：凌智铭 卢宇荣[1] LING Zhiming;LU Yurong(School of Finance,Jiangxi Normal University,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330022,China)

机构地区：[1]江西师范大学财政金融学院,江西南昌330022

出　　处：《金融教育研究》2023年第4期64-73,共10页Research of Finance and Education

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“媒体报道与审计监督协同提升地方政府债务信息披露质量研究”(19CGL012)。

摘　　要：利用中国沪、深2010—2019年的A股上市公司数据,研究企业党组织嵌入与高管薪酬黏性的关系。结果表明:企业党组织嵌入能显著降低高管薪酬黏性,并且党组织嵌入能通过降低代理成本来抑制高管薪酬黏性。其中,党组织嵌入在国有企业、选择非“四大”进行审计、低会计信息质量的环境下的治理作用更显著。Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2019,this paper studies the relationship between Party organization embedding and executive pay stickiness.The results show that party organization embedding can significantly reduce the stickiness of executive compensation,and Party organization embedding can inhibit the stickiness of executive compensation by reducing agency costs.Among them,the governance role of the Party organization is more significant in the environment of state-owned enterprises,non-“Big Four”auditing and low accounting information quality.

关 键 词：党组织嵌入 薪酬黏性 公司治理 

分 类 号：F272.7[经济管理—企业管理]