双碳背景下制造业绿色生产演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Production in Manufacturing Industry Under the Background of Carbon Peak and Carbon Neutrality

作　　者：于恩梅 张克勇[1] 王文寅[1] YU Enmei;ZHANG Keyong;WANG Wenyin(School of Economics and Management,North University of China,Taiyuan 030051,China)

机构地区：[1]中北大学经济与管理学院,太原030051

出　　处：《河南科学》2023年第6期883-893,共11页Henan Science

基　　金：山西省社科联重点研究项目(SSKLZDKT2022055);山西省社科联重点课题(SKLZDKT2020086)。

摘　　要：以制造业企业、政府监管部门以及零售商为主体构建三方博弈模型,分析了三方各自决策的演化稳定性,研究了各要素对各参与方策略选择的影响,并分析了演化博弈中均衡点的稳定性.研究表明:增加政府对不安装环保设备的制造业企业的惩罚力度,以及对积极安装环保设备的制造业企业的奖励,均有助于促进制造业企业安装环保设备;环保设备使用成本的提高会降低制造业企业选择安装环保设备的概率;增加政府监管部门对存在互惠偏好的零售商的补贴金额会促进零售商的互惠偏好行为,但是会抑制政府监管部门进行积极监管,在零售商策略和政府监管部门策略的双重作用下,制造业企业选择安装环保设备的概率降低.最后,基于研究结论,提出了几点建议.This paper constructs a tripartite game model with manufacturing enterprises,government regulators and retailers as the main body,analyzes the evolutionary stability of each decision of the three parties,studies the impact of each element on the strategic choice of each participant,and analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point in the evolutionary game.The research shows that increasing the government’s punishments for manufacturing enterprises that do not install environmental protection equipment,and the awards for manufacturing enterprises that actively install environmental protection equipment,will help to promote manufacturing enterprises to in stall environmental protection equipment.The increase in the cost of using environmental protection equipment will reduce the probability of manufacturing enterprises choosing to install environmental protection equipment.Increasing the subsidy amount provided by government regulatory authorities to retailers with reciprocal preferences will enhance the reciprocity preference degree of retailers,but will inhibit the active supervision of government regulators.Under the dual role of retailer strategy and government regulator strategy,the probability of manufacturing enterprises choosing to install environmental protection equipment is reduced.Finally,based on the research findings,several suggestions are proposed.

关 键 词：碳减排 互惠偏好 三方演化博弈 制造业 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]