考虑零售商产品抽样检测的供应链协调机制分析  

Research on Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Considering Retailer Sampling

作　　者：罗子灿 凌珊妮 童彩吟 LUO Zi-can;LING Shan-ni;TONG Cai-yin(Business School,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou Hunan,412007)

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲412007

出　　处：《山西大同大学学报（自然科学版）》2023年第3期61-70,共10页Journal of Shanxi Datong University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会课题[XSP19YBC214];湖南省哲学社会科学基金年度项目[17JD27]。

摘　　要：在产品质量提升和产品检测的背景下,在由单一供应商与单一零售商组成的两级供应链中引入了零售商产品抽样检测率这一变量,采用Stackelberg博弈模型,分析对比了集中决策和分散决策下的最佳决策值和最大收益,并以集中决策为基准引入了收益共享—成本分担契约。研究结果表明:集中决策下的产品抽样检测率和供应链总利润大于分散决策下的产品抽样检测率和供应链总利润,并且收益共享—成本分担契约能够协调供应链,达到帕累托改进的目的。最后,利用数值分析对模型计算结果进行了真实性验证。In the context of product quality improvement and inspection,the variable of product sampling inspection rate of retailer is introduced in the two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer,the optimal values and maximum profit of centralized and decentralized decision-making model are compared and analyzed by using the Stackelberg game model,and then the revenue sharing-cost sharing contract is introduced based on the centralized decision-making model.The results show that the sampling rate for product inspection and the profit of the entire supply chain are higher in the centralized decision-making model than in the decentralized decision-making model,and revenue sharing-cost sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination and lead to Pareto improvement.Finally,the model calculation results are verified by numerical analysis.

关 键 词：产品抽样检测率 收益共享—成本分担契约 供应链协调 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]