高管内部治理、真实盈余管理与企业研发投入  

Internal Governance of Executives,Real Surplus Management and Corporate R&D Investment

作　　者：陈宏超 于佳敏 Chen Hongchao;Yu Jiamin(School of Finance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学金融学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学研究生论丛》2023年第2期106-118,共13页Journal of the Postgraduates of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

摘　　要：本文以中国2009—2020年的上市公司为研究对象,运用非总经理高管相对总经理的薪酬和非总经理高管距离退休的时间衡量非总经理高管内部治理水平,实证检验了真实盈余管理在非总经理高管内部治理与研发投入之间的作用机制。研究发现,非总经理高管内部治理可以降低企业真实盈余管理水平,从而会对企业的研发投入产生显著正向影响。进一步分析发现,当总经理同为董事长时,研发投入的影响因非总经理高管内部治理得到进一步加强。分组检验发现,在非国有企业中,高管的内部治理效果更好。This paper empirically examines the mediating effect of real surplus management between the internal governance of executives other than general manager and R&D investment based on data researching listed companies in China from 2009 to 2020,using the remuneration of executives other than general manager relative to general managers and the time to retirement of executives other than general manager to measure the internal governance level of executives other than general manager.According to the research,the internal governance of executives other than general manager can reduce the level of real surplus management,which exerts a significant positive impact on company R&D investment.Further investigation finds that the effect of executives other than general manager internal governance on R&D investment is ulteriorly strengthened when the general manager is also the chairman of the board.Subgroup tests find that internal governance of executives is better in non-state enterprises.

关 键 词：高管内部治理 真实盈余管理 研发投入 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]