绿色投资者能抑制企业漂绿行为吗?  

Can Green Investors Restrain Corporate Greenwashing?

作　　者：陈玲芳[1] CHEN Lingfang

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学经济学院,福建福州350117

出　　处：《福建师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2023年第3期31-42,168,共13页Journal of Fujian Normal University:Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“多元主体视角下企业漂绿行为的形成机理、负面效应与协同治理研究”(20BGL128)。

摘　　要：绿色投资者是资本市场的重要参与者,将对企业环境行为产生重要影响。以我国工业上市公司作为研究对象,基于有效监督假说与利益合谋假说,实证检验绿色投资者对企业漂绿行为的影响。回归模型显示:绿色投资者能够发挥治理作用,显著抑制企业漂绿行为。绿色投资者主要通过缓解信息不对称和提高内部控制质量实现对漂绿行为的识别与抑制作用。严格的政府环境规制与完善的制度环境强化了绿色投资者对企业漂绿的抑制作用。漂绿的有效治理需要政府部门、资本市场与制度环境的协调配合、共同参与。研究结论对培育绿色投资者、加强漂绿治理具有重要的参考价值。Green investors are important participants in the capital market and will have a significant impact on corporate environmental behavior.Based on the competing hypotheses of effective supervision and interest collusion,the actual impact of green investors on greenwashing behavior is examined using the data of industrial listed companies in China.The results of regression models showed that green investors can play a governance role and significantly restrain corporate greenwashing by reducing information asymmetry and improving internal control quality.Strict government environmental regulations and a sound institutional environment strengthen the restraining effect of green investors on corporate greenwashing.The effective governance on greenwashing behavior requires the collaborate participation of both the government and the market.The research findings have significant reference value for nurturing green investors and strengthening greenwashing governance.

关 键 词：绿色投资者 企业漂绿 治理效应 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]