大股东股权质押与上市公司非效率投资——基于“动机-机会-能力”框架  

Large Shareholder Equity Pledges and Inefficient Investment in Listed Companies--Based on the"Motivation-Opportunity-Capability"Framework

作　　者：叶蓓[1,2] YE Bei

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学法学与经济学院,湖北武汉430064 [2]湖北省中小企业研究中心,湖北武汉430064

出　　处：《生产力研究》2023年第6期9-17,I0002,共10页Productivity Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“股权质押上市公司非效率投资风险及防控对策研究”(19BJY245)。

摘　　要：依托“动机-机会-能力”框架,从股权质押后大股东行为动机异化入手,研究股权质押对上市公司投资效率的影响;从机会、能力视角,讨论融资约束、公司治理的作用。在构建股权质押-非效率投资理论模型基础上,利用2010—2020年A股非金融上市公司数据进行实证研究,结果表明:大股东股权质押显著加剧上市公司非效率投资;股权质押比例越高,非效率投资越为严重;股权质押显著加剧上市公司融资约束,融资约束部分中介了股权质押对投资效率的影响;公司治理对股权质押引发的非效率投资具有调节作用,公司治理越薄弱,股权质押越容易引发非效率投资。研究为防范大股东股权质押下的非效率投资提供了重要思路。Based on the"motivation-opportunity-capacity"framework,we study the impact of equity pledges on the investment efficiency of listed companies,starting from the motivation of major shareholders'behavior after equity pledges,and discussing the role of financing constraints and corporate governance from the perspective of opportunity and capacity.On the basis of constructing the theoretical model of equity pledge-inefficient investment,an empirical study is conducted using the data of A-share non-financial listed companies from 2010-2020.The results show that:equity pledge of major shareholders significantly aggravates inefficient investment of listed companies;the higher the proportion of equity pledge,the more serious the inefficient investment;equity pledge significantly aggravates financing constraint of listed companies,and financing constraint partially mediates the impact of equity pledges on investment efficiency;corporate governance has a moderating effect on inefficient investment triggered by equity pledges,and the weaker the corporate governance,the more likely equity pledges trigger inefficient investment.The study provides important ideas for preventing inefficient investment under equity pledges by large shareholders.

关 键 词：股权质押 非效率投资 动机 机会 能力 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]