考虑消费者偏好及渠道权力的可替代产品供应链的定价和绿色投入决策  

Pricing and Green Input Decisions of a Competitive Supply Chain with Consumers’Product Preference and Different Channel Powers

作　　者：陈克兵 孔颖琪 雷东[2] CHEN Ke-bing;KONG Ying-qi;LEI Dong(College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 210016,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第5期1-10,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971113,71571100)。

摘　　要：随消费者环保意识的增强,绿色产品与同类型传统产品间的零售竞争日益激烈。针对一个生产传统产品的制造商和一个生产绿色产品的制造商以及一个共同零售商组成的供应链系统,根据制造商间不同的渠道权力结构,建立了相应的二级供应链博弈模型,研究了消费者绿色需求敏感度和渠道权力结构对产品定价、订货量、绿色成本投入以及供应链成员利润的影响。最后,从供应链全局的角度,通过成本共担——两部定价机制对成员之间的决策进行了协调,并给出了实现供应链成员利润帕累托改进的条件。研究发现:绿色制造成本与单位生产成本负相关而与绿色需求敏感度正相关,这种成本在集成式供应链模式下最高,在绿色制造商主导供应链下次高;当某一制造商在定价决策中占主导时其产品的批发价更高,却在竞争方占主导时获得更高的利润。通过对三种博弈模型的比较,发现当绿色需求敏感度较低时,零售商在绿色制造商与传统制造商的纳什博弈中可获得最高的利润。但随着绿色需求敏感度增高,零售商在绿色制造商主导下可获得最高的利润,同时供应链系统也将获得更多的整体利润。With the increase of customers'environmental awareness and the intensification of market competition,the right sales decisions are significantly important for any green product enterprises to enter,occupy,consolidate and expand their markets.For this,a supply chain system consisting of one traditional manufacturer,one green manufacturer and one retailer is developed.Depending on the channel powers of two manufacturers in the system,three supply chain game models,i.e.,traditional-manufacturer-leader Stackelberg game model,green-manufacturer-leader Stackelberg game model and Nash game model between both manufacturers,are considered.How the different channel power structures and the consumers'green preference affect the decisions of wholesale prices,retail prices,order quantities,green input and supply chain profits is mainly investigated in this study.Furthermore,a cost-sharing and two-part-tariff contract is proposed to coordinate such a supply chain,and the Pareto improvement condition for each supply chain member's profit is given.The results show that the green input cost is negatively related to the unit production cost but positively related to the price sensitivity of demand.The cost is the highest in the centralized decision and the second highest when the green manufacturer is the leader of the supply chain.The unit wholesale price provided by the manufacturer will be higher when she is the leader.The manufacturer can obtain a higher profit when the competitor acting as the Stackelberg leader.It can be found that when consumers are more sensitive to the green product,the green manufacturer will increase its green investment cost to improve the popularity of the product and thus increase demand.Naturally,the increase of green investment cost will result in the increase of the price of the green product,which will also lead to the increase of traditional product's price provided by the rival manufacturer.Comparing these three game models,it can be found that when the green sensitivity of demand is low,the re

关 键 词：绿色供应链 博弈论 渠道权力 消费者绿色偏好 协调 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]