不同信息策略下竞争型网络货运平台定价研究  

Research on Pricing of Competitive Network Freight Platform under Different Information Strategy

作　　者：桂云苗[1,2] 程静 龚本刚[1] GUI Yun-miao;CHENG Jing;GONG Ben-gang(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China;School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工程大学经济与管理学院,安徽芜湖241000 [2]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第5期176-186,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071002);安徽省自然科学基金资助项目(2008085MG229);安徽省优秀科研创新团队资助项目(2022AH010061)。

摘　　要：信息策略已成为竞争型网络货运平台供需协调的重要手段。本文研究了不同竞争环境下考虑控制用户信息的策略性行为的网络货运平台定价问题,建立了基于Hotelling的寡头竞争性网络货运平台博弈决策模型,并分别从四种不同用户归属角度探讨网络货运平台定价策略。比较分析发现,双边单归属时,对不完全信息的发货商的最优定价小于其他信息策略情形;发货商多归属时,若发货商为不完全信息者,则对承运商的最优定价高于其他信息策略情形;承运商多归属时,仅当双边用户均为不完全信息者,对发货商的最优定价高于其他信息策略情形;双边多归属时,仅当承运商为不完全信息者,对发货商的最优定价高于其他信息策略情形。双边单归属或单边多归属时,平台选择对双边用户均提供不完全信息策略更有利。双边多归属时,平台选择对发货商提供不完全信息策略更有利。With the wide application of information technology,information strategy has become an important means to coordinate the supply and demand of many logistics platforms.As information coordinators,bilateral platforms strategically hide part of market information or control the information obtained by users to maximize their own interests.As a new type of bilateral platform,the network freight platform is facing different information levels between shippers and carriers.Therefore,how to make the optimal price and choose the optimal information strategy under the incomplete information user becomes an important issue for the sustainable development of network freight platform.Starting from providing different information strategies,a pricing model based on Hotelling,an oligopolistic competitive network freight platform is constructed,and the optimal pricing of the platform under different information strategies is discussed from four different user ownership perspectives.Through comparative analysis,it is found that no matter what kind of users they belong to,the platform pricing for bilateral users is equal.Under bilateral orders the shipper’s,price is equal to that when the platform provides incomplete information strategy to both bilateral users and incomplete information strategy only to the carrier,which is greater than that when the platform provides incomplete information strategy only to the shipper.The carrier's price is equal when the platform provides an incomplete information policy for both bilateral users and when the platform provides an incomplete information policy only for the shipper.When the network externality of shipper side is larger than a certain value,the carrier’s price is the highest when the platform only provides incomplete information strategy to the shipper.Under the carrier multi-homing,the price of the shipper is the highest when the incomplete information strategy is provided to both users of the platform and the network externality of shipper side is within a certain threshold

关 键 词：双边市场 网络货运平台 不完全信息 HOTELLING模型 定价策略 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]