功利、应得与运气:论约翰·密尔与运气式功利主义  

Utility,Desert and Luck:John Stuart Mill and Luck Egalitarianism

作　　者：张继亮 Zhang Jiliang

机构地区：[1]东北大学文法学院

出　　处：《中国社会科学院大学学报》2023年第4期144-163,168,共21页Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助一般项目“约翰·密尔政治理论研究”(21FZZB004)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：作为平等主义的一个重要分支,运气平等主义主张人们需要消除原生运气带来的分配不平等现象。从表面上看,运气平等主义似乎与功利主义不相容,但这种看法忽略了很多功利主义理论家实际上非常重视原生运气在分配问题上的重要意义。例如,约翰·密尔在出身、性别等原生运气要素对财富、长子继承权、遗产及政治权利的影响等方面就持有运气平等主义式主张。不仅如此,他还通过应得这一功利性要素将运气平等主义与功利主义结合起来。与运气平等主义相比,密尔这种运气式功利主义能够避免运气平等主义面临的两个很难回应的反驳——遗弃式反驳与拉平式反驳。As an important branch of egalitarianism,luck egalitarianism asserts the necessity to eliminate the distributive inequality caused by brute luck.On the surface,luck egalitarianism seems incompatible with utilitarianism.However,this view ignores that many utilitarian theorists actually attach great importance to the importance of brute luck in the matter of distribution.For example,John Mill holds luck egalitarian views on the influence of birth,gender and other brute luck on wealth,primogeniture,inheritance,and political rights.In addition,he also combines luck egalitarianism with utilitarianism by the utilitarian element of desert.Compared to luck egalitarianism,Mill's luck utilitarianism can avoid two difficult objections faced by luck egalitarianism-the abandonment objection and the levelling-down objection.

关 键 词：运气 运气平等主义 应得 功利主义 约翰·密尔 

分 类 号：B82-064[哲学宗教—伦理学]