线上购物平台的产品防伪治理决策研究  

Research on product anti-counterfeiting management decision of online shopping platform

作　　者：张子健 刘晏辰 ZHANG Zijian;LIU Yanchen(School of economics and management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2023年第4期114-122,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL177)。

摘　　要：本文以线上购物平台产品防伪治理为研究对象,研究了平台及品牌供应商在防伪治理中的渠道模式选择及防伪投资决策,建立了不同平台渠道模式下防伪技术投资决策模型,分析了供应链结构对产品仿冒市场的影响,以及产品仿冒防治反过来如何影响供应链结构,得出了不同模式下防伪可信度、防伪投资阈值以及均衡利润的均衡值,并对不同模式进行比较分析。研究发现转售及代理下防伪投资都具有投资阈值,取决于市场假货渗透率,通过模式比较分析发现不同渠道结构下均衡防伪可信度、防伪投资阈值以及均衡利润都有不同。Many problems including the spread of counterfeit activities,consumer information leakage,information asymmetry,and dispute liability that are difficult to eliminate in the transaction process.For the development of the e-commerce market,it is important for us to explore effective counterfeiting governance methods,improve supply chain transparency and security,and enhance consumer trust and loyalty.Under the dual background of counterfeiting influence and the coexistence of different sales models in the market,this paper considers the two-stage supply chain system composed of brand owners and online platforms,establishes an anti-counterfeiting mechanism with online platforms as the main body,discusses anti-counterfeiting investment decisions of online platforms and the follow-up situations of brand owners under different channel models,and compares and analyzes whether the anti-counterfeiting investment mechanism under different channel models will produce different effects.The first part discusses the anti-counterfeiting investment decisions of online platforms under different channel models.There is a threshold for the impact of the penetration rate of counterfeit goods on anti-counterfeiting investment decisions.When the penetration rate of counterfeit goods is small,the online platform should not establish an anti-counterfeiting system;when the penetration rate of counterfeit goods is high,the online platform must be established;At the middle threshold,online platforms should make different decisions under different channel modes.This paper builds a two-stage game model,studies the impact of the establishment of anti-counterfeiting mechanism on the online platform on the profits of members in the supply chain,and analyzes and concludes the anti-counterfeiting investment decisions of the online platform under different channel modes.Four different models are formed:1.WN model:All supply chain members are in the resale model,and the online platform has not established an anti-counterfeiting mechanism.At this ti

关 键 词：线上平台 渠道模式 防伪治理 决策机制 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]