碳配额交易政策下闭环供应链谎报决策与协调研究  

Research on misreporting strategies and coordination of closed-loop supply chain under cap-and-trade policy

作　　者：张令荣[1] 刘笑言[1] 王锋[1] 彭博[1] 鲁渤 ZHANG Lingrong;LIU Xiaoyan;WANG Feng;PENG Bo;LU Bo(School of Economics and Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2023年第4期196-205,共10页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(20&ZD129);国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BGL111)。

摘　　要：本文以单制造商和单零售商组成的闭环供应链为研究对象,考虑碳配额交易政策下制造商回收努力难度和新产品单位碳排放量信息不对称,探讨不同权力结构下制造商的谎报行为及其对供应链绩效的影响。研究发现:制造商主导供应链时,制造商不会谎报其私有信息;零售商主导供应链时,制造商会低报回收努力难度同时高报新产品单位碳排放量;制造商与零售商权力均等时,制造商仅高报新产品单位碳排放量。制造商的谎报行为始终会损害零售商及供应链总体利润。针对制造商的谎报行为,本文采用两部定价契约进行协调,并验证了该契约能有效激励制造商反馈真实信息,并使供应链绩效达到最优。China is now in the stage of high-quality development,and the green economy,energy conservation and environmental protection have attracted more and more attention from the government and enterprises.The Central Economic Work Conference in 2020 listed“doing a good job in achieving carbon peak and carbon neutrality”as one of the key tasks in 2021.Carbon quota and trading mechanism is indispensable in the process of achieving emission reduction targets in China,and recycling and remanufacturing is also an important part of energy conservation and emission reduction.The 14th Five-Year Plan proposes to accelerate the promotion of green and low-carbon development,continue to improve environmental quality,and comprehensively improve the efficiency of resource utilization.Recycling and remanufacturing of waste products can not only reduce the manufacturing cost of products,but also reduce carbon emissions,and play the role of protecting the environment and saving resources.Due to the complexity of recycling,the cost of manufacturers′recycling efforts is usually private information,which is difficult for retailers to accurately observe.Empirical research shows that although most enterprises are increasingly aware of environmental protection,the overall carbon emission information disclosure is insufficient.In this paper,a closed-loop supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is taken as the research subject.Considering the information asymmetry between the manufacturer′s difficulty of recovery efforts and the unit carbon emission of new products under the carbon quota and trade policy,three Stackelberg game models are established under three scenarios:manufacturer-led supply chain,retailer-led supply chain and equal-power supply chain.The optimal decision and the optimal result under the three situations are compared and analyzed to explore the manufacturer′s misreporting behavior and its impact on supply chain performance under different power structures.The study found that when man

关 键 词：碳配额交易 信息不对称 谎报行为 两部定价契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]