丁若镛“自主之权”与“善恶”的内在逻辑探析  

On the Internal Logic of Jeong Ruoyong’s“Right of Autonomy”and“Good and Evil”

作　　者：高明文 崔美玲[1] Gao Mingwen;Cui Meiling

机构地区：[1]延边大学马克思主义学院,延吉133002 [2]延边大学朝鲜·韩国研究中心

出　　处：《延边大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第4期58-66,142,共10页Journal of Yanbian University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：延边大学博士科研启动基金项目资助。

摘　　要：丁若镛的自主之权通常被解释为利玛窦式的自由意志或康德式的道德性自律。二者的不同之处在于前者强调自主之权是人可以自由地在善与恶中选择其中之一的能力,后者强调自主之权是人可以战胜恶的自我约束能力;共同之处在于二者都预设了绝对的善和恶的存在,同时也预设了人具有客观判断善和恶的超验能力。但通过诠释学以经解经法对文本中的自主之权与善恶的内在逻辑进行分析发现:(1)丁若镛的自主之权是以善为目的的行为规划能力,既不承认绝对的善和恶的存在,也不承认人具有判断绝对的善和恶的能力;(2)恶源于“不思考”;(3)善是“符合情境的行为”。这意味着丁若镛在创造性转化和创新性发展儒学的过程中并未简单采取直接引进西方思想的方法,而是在扬弃中积极发扬儒学精髓。Jeong Ruoyong’s right of autonomy is usually interpreted as Ricci’s free will or Kantian’s moral self-discipline.The difference between the two is that the former emphasizes that the right of autonomy is a person’s ability to freely choose between good and evil.The latter highlights the right to self-determination is the ability of man to overcome evil.The common point is that both presuppose the existence of absolute good and evil,as well as the transcendental ability to judge good and evil objectively.However,through hermeneutics’analysis of the inner logic of autonomy and good-evil in the text,it is found that(1)Jeong’s autonomy is the ability to plan actions for good.Neither it acknowledges the existence of absolute good and evil,nor does man have the ability to judge absolute good and evil;(2)evil stems from“not thinking”;and(3)good is“a contextual act”.This also means that Jeong did not adopt the method of introducing Western thought directly in the process of creative transformation and innovative development of Confucianism,but actively carried forward the essence of Confucianism.

关 键 词：丁若镛 “自主之权” 善恶 诚 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]