双重委托-代理关系下网络货运平台物流服务质量问题与激励措施  

Incentive Measures of the Logistics Service Quality Problems for Network Freight Platform under Dual Principal-agent Relationship

作　　者：王金妹 郝旭龙 WANG JINMEI;HAO XULONG(School of Economics&Management Fuzhou University,Fuzhou Fujian 350108,China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州310108

出　　处：《西安电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第2期49-55,共7页Journal of Xidian University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：福建省社科研究基地重大项目“动荡与冲突背景下福建省电子信息产业供应链中断风险管理研究”(FJ2022JDZ021)。

摘　　要：针对当前网络货运平台运营中存在的货物运输过程监管不到位、运输质量风险大及服务观念落后等物流服务质量问题,综合考虑网络货运平台和实际承运人有限理性下具有公平偏好的特征,运用双重委托-代理理论,从内外部两个角度探析网络货运平台运营过程中出现物流服务质量问题的具体原因,并重点针对由于信息不对称造成的网络货运平台和实际承运人隐藏质量努力水平的道德风险问题,分别提出考虑动机公平和收益分配公平的物流服务质量激励措施。Given the logistics service quality problems such as inadequate supervision of cargo transportation process,high risk of transportation quality and backward service concept that generally exist in the operation of current network freight platform,this paper analyzes the characteristics of the network freight platform and the actual carriers with fair preferences under limited rationality based on the dual principal-agent theory,and explores the specific causes of logistics service quality problems in the network freight platform from both internal and external perspectives.Then,to address the moral hazard problem of the hidden quality effort level of the network freight platform and the actual carriers caused by information asymmetry,the incentive measures for the logistics service quality problems that consider motivation equity and benefit distribution equity are proposed.

关 键 词：网络货运平台 双重委托-代理 物流服务质量 公平偏好 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济]