政府政策引导下国有企业引入战略投资者演化博弈及仿真分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis and Simulation Research on Introducing Strategic Investors into State-owned Enterprises under the Guidance of Government Policies

作　　者：张倩 ZHANG Qian(China Business Executives Academy,Dalian 116068,China;Business School,Dalian University of Technology,Panjin 124221,China)

机构地区：[1]中国大连高级经理学院,辽宁大连116068 [2]大连理工大学商学院,辽宁盘锦124221

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第6期97-103,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：辽宁省社科规划基金项目(L17CJY009);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(DUT21RW121)。

摘　　要：构建演化博弈模型探究国有企业引入战略投资者过程中双方的行为逻辑和策略选择,求解稳定均衡策略,仿真模拟不同初始状态下博弈参与主体的策略选择及其受激励政策影响的动态演化过程。研究表明:政府激励政策会影响博弈双方的策略选择,且在不同初始状态下存在差异,当双方初始意愿较低时,国有企业选择引入策略的概率随激励力度增加而提升,初始意愿较高平时,战略投资者最优策略选择转为“参与”。国有企业初始意愿较高时,政策倾斜具有“锦上添花”的促进效应,初始意愿较低时,则减缓了其收敛速度;当双方初始意愿较高时,激励政策供给概率下降使参与主体的最优策略选择发生根本性变化。Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China explicitly proposed to actively develop the mixed ownership economy,the reform of mixed ownership has sped up and achieved remarkable results.As one of the approaches,the introduction of strategic investors has attracted widespread attention.From the perspective of existing research,insufficient attention has been paid to the interests of participants in the reform of mixed ownership,either ignoring the policy factors,resulting in a certain disconnect between theoretical research and practice,or considering the participants incompletely.In view of this,the paper focuses on the following issues:What are the behavioral logic and strategic choices of both sides of the game in the process? How do their strategic choices dynamic evolve under different policy incentives? Is there a heterogeneity? The study and discussion of the above issues help clarify the behavioral logic of participants,improve the effectiveness of introducing strategic investors and optimize policy supply.Compared with existing research,the possible contributions include:Firstly,in terms of research methods,an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the strategic choices of Chinese state-owned enterprises and strategic investors,enriching and expanding the research on the strategic interactions of heterogeneous actors in the new round of mixed reform.Secondly,focusing on how policy incentives affect system evolution not only expands relevant research,but also provides a useful reference for optimizing policy supply.This paper analyzes the strategic choice behavior of both sides in the process of introducing strategic investors into state-owned enterprises by constructing an evolutionary game model,and solves the stable equilibrium strategy.The strategic choice behavior of game players in different initial states and the dynamic evolution process affected by government incentive policies are simulated.The results show that the government incentive

关 键 词：国有企业 战略投资者 混合所有制改革 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]