民营企业高管薪酬与盈余管理关系的实证研究  

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Executive Remuneration and Earnings Management in Private Enterprises

作　　者：刘亚男[1] 王华巍[1] LIU Ya-nan;WANG Hua-wei(School of Economics and Management,Lu’an Vocational Technical College,Lu’an 237158,China)

机构地区：[1]六安职业技术学院经济管理学院,安徽六安237158

出　　处：《湖北科技学院学报》2023年第4期35-40,共6页Journal of Hubei University of Science and Technology

基　　金：安徽省重点教学研究项目“1+X证书制度下大数据与会计专业的重构与融合发展研究”(2021jyxm1443);安徽省重大教学研究项目“财务大数据背景下会计专业实践教学改革与创新研究”(2020jyxm1839);安徽省高校优秀拔尖人才培育项目“大学生营销创业实务社会实践课程建设”(gxbjZD2022122)。

摘　　要：以充分了解企业高管薪酬和盈余管理关系为目的,展开民营企业高管薪酬与盈余管理关系的实证研究。通过分析民营企业高管定义与高管薪酬内容、盈余管理特征与动机后,设置4个高管薪酬与盈余管理实证假设条件,并使用民营企业年末资产替代其年初资产后,将企业经营现金流量与其对应的利润输入到Jones模型内,使用Jones模型得到民营企业高管薪酬与盈余管理变量的估计系数。实证结果表明:本文方法选取的企业高管薪酬与盈余管理变量在5%和1%水平上较为显著,选取变量能力较好;民营企业盈余管理和高管薪酬的估计系数数值为正数,并在水平为1%时显著性较强,民营企业盈余管理活动随着企业高管薪酬的增加而增加;民营企业高管任期时间和薪酬与盈余管理估计系数数值成正比例;高管拥有股份时,其薪酬和盈余管理关系相关性不大。In order to fully understand the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management,we carry out empirical research on the relationship between executive compensation and earnings management in private enterprises.After analyzing the definition of senior executives and the content of senior executives' compensation,the characteristics and motivation of earnings management in private enterprises,four empirical assumptions of senior executives' compensation and earnings management are set,and after the year-end assets of private enterprises are used to replace their assets at the beginning of the year,the operating cash flow of enterprises and their corresponding profits are input into Jones model,and the estimation coefficients of senior executives' compensation and earnings management variables of private enterprises are obtained by Jones model.The empirical results show that the variables of executive compensation and earnings management selected by this method are significant at the level of 5% and 1%,and the ability to select variables is good;The estimated coefficient of earnings management and executive compensation of private enterprises is positive,and it is significant when the level is 1%.The earnings management activities of private enterprises increase with the increase of executive compensation;The tenure and salary of senior executives in private enterprises are in direct proportion to the estimated coefficient of earnings management;When executives own shares,there is little correlation between their compensation and earnings management.

关 键 词：民营企业 高管薪酬 盈余管理 假设条件 皮尔逊系数 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]