媒体背景董秘的治理角色:基于股价崩盘风险的证据  

The Governance Role of Board Secretary with Media Background:The Evidence Based on Stock Price Crash Risk

作　　者：俞萍 何慧华 方军雄 YU Ping;HE Hui-hua;FANG Jun-xiong

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学会计学院 [2]华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2023年第3期77-89,共13页Finance Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72272132,71872048)。

摘　　要：作为信息披露中连接公司与信息使用者的纽带,董秘对公司信息披露质量的影响引起了业界和学者的关注,本文考察了媒体背景董秘对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现,具有媒体从业背景的董秘,其所在公司的股价崩盘风险更低。经过一系列稳健性检验之后,上述发现依然成立。分组检验显示,媒体背景董秘的这种缓解作用在民营企业和外部治理效果较好的公司中表现更为明显。进一步研究发现,更好的信息披露、吸引更多的证券分析师跟踪和减少坏消息囤积是三个可能的影响渠道。最后,本文还发现,资本市场利益相关者对此作出了积极的反应,媒体背景董秘所在公司的估值更高、股权融资成本和债权融资成本更低。As the bridge between investors and corporations,the role of the board secretary brings more attention from academic researchers.This paper studies the effect of board secretary with media background on stock price crash risk.We find that the stock price crash risk is lower in corporations with the board secretary with media background.And these effects are more significant in good corporate governance firms and private firms.Further research finds that better information disclosure,more analysts following and less bad news hoarding are three possible channels of the influence.At last,the stakeholders respond to the board secretary with media background positively,that is,higher valuation,lower cost of equity and debt.

关 键 词：董秘 职业背景 媒体背景 股价崩盘风险 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]