会计信息质量检查、董事联结与财务重述  

Accounting Information Quality Inspection,Director Connection and Financial Restatement

作　　者：王敏 WANG Min(Finance and Accounting Research Center,Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100142,China)

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院财务与会计研究中心,北京100142

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2023年第4期65-73,共9页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：中国财政科学研究院2022年招标课题(02040001002024)。

摘　　要：基于财务重述视角,考察会计信息质量检查制度的直接治理和间接治理效应。研究发现:会计信息质量检查显著降低被公告公司财务重述概率,也会降低与被公告公司存在内部董事联结关系(简称“内部董事联结”)公司的财务重述概率,但对与被公告公司存在外部董事联结关系(简称“外部董事联结”)公司的财务重述概率无显著影响。强化媒体报道和内部控制质量是缓解会计信息质量检查在外部董事联结中间接治理失效的有效措施;会计信息质量检查监管力度加大会进一步降低被公告公司以及内部董事联结公司财务重述概率。Based on the perspective of financial restatement,this paper explores the direct and indirect effects of the accounting information quality inspection.It is found that the accounting information quality inspection significantly reduces the financial restatement probability of the announced company,and also reduces the financial restatement probability of the company by internal director connection(referred to as“internal director connection”),but the financial restatement probability of the company by external director connection(referred to as“external director connection”)has no significant change.Strengthening media reports and internal control quality are effective measures to alleviate the indirect effect failure of the accounting information quality inspection in the connection of external directors;The increase of quality inspection and supervision of accounting information will further reduce the financial restatement probability of the announced company and the company connected by internal directors.

关 键 词：会计信息质量检查 财务重述 董事联结 间接治理 

分 类 号：F275.2[经济管理—企业管理]