类存在、死亡和灭绝之恶  

Species-Being and the Badness of Extinction and Death

作　　者：克莉丝汀·科斯嘉 卢俊豪(译) Christine M.Korsgaard

机构地区：[1]美国哈佛大学哲学系 [2]中山大学哲学系

出　　处：《当代中国价值观研究》2023年第3期112-128,共17页Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目“道德规范性的心性基础研究”(2021M693693);广东省哲学社会科学规划青年项目“道德情感的心性结构研究”(GD21YZX01);广州市社科规划课题“中华民族共同体意识与青年国家认同研究——以爱国主义情感赋能为核心”(2020GZGJ04)的研究成果。

摘　　要：就费尔巴哈和马克思所说的“类存在”属性,本文提供了一种解释:人类有一种独特倾向,会将自身视为其所属之类的成员,并将该类视为“我们”。这一解释将类存在的概念与康德的权利理论相联系,认为每个权利主张都会使其主张者做出诸如世界政府的承诺,并因此对作为某一集体能动者的人类概念有所承诺。该解释也将类存在与实践同一性联系起来,认为我们的生活和行动之所以是有价值的,是因为我们为人类生活作出了积极贡献。接着,本文将论证,由此而得出的人类概念,连同一些关于善之本质的特定考虑,会提供依据以质疑人们所熟悉的这一主张:死亡一般对人类比对动物而言更糟糕。另一方面,因为类存在,类的灭绝对人类而言,是一种比对其他动物而言更糟糕的景象。This paper offers an account of the property Feuerbach and Marx called“speciesbeing,”the human being's distinctive tendency to identify herself as a member of her species,and to think of the species as a“we.”It links the notion to Kant's theory of rights,arguing that every claim of right commits the maker of that claim to something like world government,and therefore to the conception of humanity as a collective agent.It also links species-being to the concept of practical identity,arguing that the conceptions under which we find our lives and actions valuable are ones according to which we make a positive contribution to the life of the species.It then argues that the resulting conception of humanity,together with certain considerations about the nature of the good,provides grounds for challenging the familiar claim that death is generally worse for human beings than for animals.On the other hand,because of species-being,the extinction of our species is a much worse prospect for human beings than for the other animals.

关 键 词：动物 集体能动性 死亡 灭绝 人类 类存在 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]