机构交叉持股能抑制企业创新失败吗  

Can Institutional Cross Shareholding Inhibit the Failure of Enterprise Innovation?

作　　者：王靖宇 张宏亮[2] Wang Jingyu;Zhang Hongliang(School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China;Business School,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [2]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2023年第14期51-61,共11页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL098)。

摘　　要：以2010—2021年中国A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,采用倍差法分析发现,机构交叉持股能够抑制企业创新失败,其作用路径在于,机构交叉持股通过减缓企业外部融资压力、约束高管代理问题对企业创新失败发挥治理作用。情境检验结果表明,在机构持股量较大、机构持股深度较高、股票流动性较强的环境下,机构交叉持股对企业创新失败的抑制作用显著。结论不仅能够丰富机构交叉持股治理后果研究,而且可为有效抑制企业创新失败,进而提升企业创新水平提供参考。Innovation plays an important role in driving China's high-quality economic development.In the environment of market economy,enterprises are the most important market players.Compared with other market players,enterprises have the advantages of high efficiency and strong market orientation in innovation activities.Therefore,it has become a hot academic topic of how to promote enterprise innovation.According to the theory of industrial organization,innovation activities are characterized with high risks.According to the statistics,the probability of innovation failure of American listed companies is about 40%.Innovation failure will not only cause the loss of resource input,but also dampen the enthusiasm of senior executives for innovation,and thus it has a negative impact on the improvement of enterprise innovation level.As a highly professional subject in China's capital market,institutional investors'shareholding is proved to have a positive impact on the improvement of enterprise innovation level.On the basis of previous studies,this paper focuses on an important phenomenon in China's capital market:institutional cross shareholding,i.e.,an institutional investor holds the shares of several listed companies in the same industry at the same time.Compared with a single institutional investor's shareholding,institutional cross shareholding facilitates the flow of resources in the equity network and it is conducive to enhancing the efficiency of supervision.Because the objects of institutional cross shareholding are listed companies in the same industry,and the resources are highly complementary,the equity network connection formed based on cross shareholding is thus convenient for institutions to reasonably allocate resources based on their investment objectives;besides the corporate governance of enterprises in the same industry has a high similarity,which is conducive to reducing the cost of institutional supervision and improving the efficiency of institutional supervision.This paper centers on whether institut

关 键 词：机构交叉持股 企业创新失败 倍差法 融资约束 高管代理问题 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]