债务违约风险对企业创新效率的影响  

The Impact of Debt Default Risk on Firm Innovation Efficiency

作　　者：王守海[1] 刘烨炜 张瀛之 WANG Shouhai;LIU Yewei;ZHANG Yingzhi(School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《南京财经大学学报》2023年第3期44-54,共11页Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“会计准则体系与保险偿付能力监管规则的协调框架构建与路径优化研究”(19YJA790083);山东省自然科学基金面上项目“审计委员会专业性对分析师跟踪行为的影响研究:作用机制与经济后果”(ZR2020MG033)。

摘　　要：利用2009—2020年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验了债务违约风险对企业创新效率的影响。研究发现,债务违约风险显著降低了企业的创新效率,且这种效应具有地区异质性而不具有产权异质性;作用机制检验表明,债务违约风险通过施加“心不足—管理层风险偏好限制”和“力不足—融资约束限制”降低了企业创新效率;进一步研究发现,债务违约风险带来的研发强度下降是影响企业创新效率的重要因素;为缓解“心不足”和“力不足”的问题,检验发现企业数字化转型和政府研发补助具有重要的治理作用,但该作用存在明显的产权和地区异质性。This paper,by using the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2020,tests the effect of debt default risk on firm innovation efficiency.It is found that debt default risk significantly reduces innovation efficiency and that this effect has regional heterogeneity but not property rights heterogeneity.The mechanism test shows that the debt default risk restricts innovation efficiency by affecting managers'risk preference and financing constraints.Furthermore,we find that when firms are faced with the debt default risk,the decline of R&D intensity leads in turn to the decline of innovation efficiency.Additionally,we find that digital transformation and government R&D subsidy can mitigate the decline of firms'innovation efficiency in the face of debt default risk but that these effects have obvious property rights and regional heterogeneity.

关 键 词：债务违约风险 创新效率 资源限制 数字化转型 研发补助 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]