博弈视角下区块链驱动应收账款融资的应用机制研究  

Application Mechanism of Blockchain-driven Accounts Receivable Financing from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：王文佳 刘洋[2] WANG Wen-Jia;LIU Yang(Qilu University of Technology(Shandong Academy of Sciences),Jinan Shandong 250100;Shandong Jianzhu University,Jinan,Shandong 250100)

机构地区：[1]齐鲁工业大学(山东省科学院)经济与管理学部,山东济南250100 [2]山东建筑大学,山东济南250100

出　　处：《天津商务职业学院学报》2023年第2期36-45,共10页Journal of Tianjin College of Commerce

摘　　要：供应链金融中主要存在信用风险与操作风险,本文以应收账款融资为研究对象,分析了应收账款融资业务中影响各主体策略的因素。通过构建资金方与融资企业二者的博弈方程,对比区块链技术引入前后演化稳定策略的差异,探索区块链缓解供应链金融风险的作用机制。从中可知,资金方是否接受应收账款融资申请主要取决于信用风险,区块链技术可以通过缓解资金方的操作风险来增加资金方收益;区块链技术可营造的严格监管环境来促使融资企业守约,最终可以演化为(接受,守约)的均衡稳定状态,从而打破融资企业守约概率越高,资金方越容易拒绝融资申请的不良局面。Credit risk and operational risk are two main risks in supply chain fi⁃nance.This study takes accounts receivable financing as the research object,and ana⁃lyzes the factors affecting the strategies of various entities in this business.By construct⁃ing a game equation between the funding and the financing enterprises,and comparing the differences in evolutionary stability strategies before and after the introduction of blockchain technology,the mechanism of blockchain is explored in alleviating supply chain financial risks.It can be seen that whether the funder accepts the accounts receiv⁃able financing application mainly depends on the credit risk.Blockchain technology can increase the revenue of the funder by alleviating the operational risk;Blockchain technology can create a strict regulatory environment to encourage financing companies to comply and ultimately evolve into an equilibrium and stable state(acceptance,com⁃pliance),thereby breaking the negative situation where financing companies have a higher probability of compliance and funding parties are more likely to refuse financing applications.

关 键 词：区块链 应收账款融资 演化博弈 风险 

分 类 号：F276.3[经济管理—企业管理]