政府补贴下考虑公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Dual Channel Green Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concernunder Government Subsidies

作　　者：邵灵芝 刘倩文 SHAO Ling-zhi;LIU Qian-wen(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Ma anshan 243032,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2023年第7期55-60,47,共7页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目:考虑产品绿色创新的互补产品供应链决策与优化研究(71801004);安徽省教育厅高校人文社科优秀青年项目:市场与政策驱动的互补供应链减排策略和竞合博弈研究(2022AH030041)。

摘　　要：在零售商存在公平关切行为的双渠道绿色供应链背景下,文中考虑无政府补贴、政府根据产品绿色度补贴制造商和政府根据销售努力水平补贴零售商三种情形,采用Stackelberg博弈求解模型,对比分析公平关切行为和政府补贴方式对供应链成员决策及利润的影响。结果表明,零售商的公平关切行为会对供应链整体运营产生阻碍作用,而政府补贴可以有效提升产品绿色度、销售努力水平、制造商与零售商的利润及社会总福利,并改善因零售商公平关切行为造成的损失。且在零售商具有公平关切行为的情况下,政府根据销售努力水平对零售商提供补贴时的效果最好。In the context of a dual-channel green supply chain with retailers fairness concern behavior,this paper considers three scenarios:no government subsidies,government subsidies to manufacturers based on product green level,and government subsidies to retailers based on sales effort level,and uses the Stackelberg game solution model to compare and analyze the effects of fairness concern behavior and government subsidies on supply chain members decisions and profits.The results show that the fairness concern behavior of retailers can hinder the overall operation of the supply chain,while government subsidies can effectively improve the green level of products,sales effort level,profits of manufacturers and retailers,and total social welfare,and ameliorate the losses caused by the fairness concern behavior of retailers.The government subsidies are most effective when they are based on the level of sales effort when the retailer has fairness concern behavior.

关 键 词：政府补贴 公平关切 双渠道 绿色度 销售努力 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]